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Abstract
The objective of the research work presented in this thesis is to study
scalable video transmission over peer-to-peer networks. In particular,
we analyse how a credit-based approach and exploitation of social net-
working features can play a significant role in the design of such systems.
Peer-to-peer systems are nowadays a valid alternative to the traditional
client-server architecture for the distribution of multimedia content, as
they transfer the workload from the service provider to the final user,
with a subsequent reduction of management costs for the former. On
the other hand, scalable video coding helps in dealing with network
heterogeneity, since the content can be tailored to the characteristics
or resources of the peers. First of all, we present a study that evalu-
ates subjective video quality perceived by the final user under different
transmission scenarios. We also propose a video chunk selection al-
gorithm that maximises received video quality under different network
conditions. Furthermore, challenges in building reliable peer-to-peer
systems for multimedia streaming include optimisation of resource al-
location and design mechanisms based on rewards and punishments that
provide incentives for users to share their own resources. Our solution
relies on a credit-based architecture, where peers do not interact with
users that have proven to be malicious in the past. Finally, if peers
are allowed to build a social network of trusted users, they can share
the local information they have about the network and have a more
complete understanding of the type of users they are interacting with.
Therefore, in addition to a local credit, a social credit or social repu-
tation is introduced. This thesis concludes with an overview of future
developments of this research work.
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Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In the last few years, distribution of multimedia content over the Internet has become
very popular due to widespread diffusion of high-speed connections. The most commonly
used architecture for these applications is the traditional client-server scheme. This
model implies the presence of a client, which is interested in a certain content, and a
server, which stores and distributes it. Servers usually deal with several requests at a
time and data is replicated to increase availability and achieve fault tolerance. However,
this comes with additional costs for the service provider. Moreover, this architecture
intrinsically limits the number of simultaneous users, due to its poor scalability. This
can be a critical aspect in bandwidth-intensive applications such as video streaming.
Another important characteristic is that, in multimedia applications, video contents
of different fidelities are required according to the desired application, such as high
quality material for storage and future editing and lower bit-rate content for distribution.
In traditional video communications, video is usually processed oﬄine. Compression
and storage are tailored to the targeted users according to the available bandwidth
and potential receiver or display characteristics. However, this process requires either
transcoding of compressed content or storage of several different versions of the encoded
video.
Peer-to-peer (P2P) architectures promise to be a scalable and economical alternative
to the traditional client-server model, as users contribute by making their own resources
1
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available to the system. Other interesting features of these networks are self-organisation
and network path redundancy. However, they present a number of open issues. First
of all, some users of the system might behave as free-riders. This means that they
use resources from other peers without giving anything in exchange. In modern P2P
systems, like BitTorrent [1], this problem is tackled by providing peers with incentives
to share their upload capacities. Nevertheless, even in this case this behaviour might
sometimes pay [2]. Second, data is vulnerable to malicious pollution attacks [3]. In
this case, a peer deliberately decides to tamper with the content that is being shared,
sending other peers corrupt data, which might result in a useless received file (e.g. a
video sequence). Finally, users have different upload capacities and P2P networks are
highly heterogeneous. All the issues previously introduced are a common feature of
many P2P systems, not necessarily performing scalable transmission. In addition, video
streaming over P2P networks presents further challenges. For example, data chunks
have strict deadlines, represented by their playback time. In fact, if a video part is not
received in time, the system may either be paused or part of the video will be skipped.
Therefore, this is a challenge that needs to be specifically tackled in the design of these
systems.
The problem of network heterogeneity can be partially solved by using Scalable Video
Coding (SVC). This allows adaptation of the content to different users requirements by
selecting an appropriate sub-set of the original sequence for download and discarding the
rest. These codecs can use DCT-like transforms – where DCT represents the Discrete
Cosine Transform [4] – such as the standard H.264/SVC [5], or the wavelet transform [6],
like the wavelet-based SVC developed at our institution (WSVC) [7]. In both cases,
adaptation can be performed in terms of frame size, frame rate or Signal-to-Noise Ratio
(SNR), the latter also being known as quality scalability. In this research work, our
proposed algorithms have been designed for WSVC. The choice of this codec is relevant
from a research point of view, as in a significant number of cases its performance is
comparable with or better than the standard. Moreover, WSVC presents appealing
features such as efficient management of Fine-Grain (quality) Scalability (FGS). Finally,
due to the fact that the two codecs present a similar bit-stream structure, we consider
our results obtained in a P2P environment valid for the general SVC case.
Resource reciprocation in P2P networks has been an important area of research for
many years. In fact, P2P is based on the idea that users should contribute their band-
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width voluntarily. This implies that if there are no rewards for cooperative behaviour
and punishments for free-riders a peer that behaves rationally [8] would never share its
resources with the rest of the system. Several models, like the original BitTorrent [1]
focus on interactions with a limited set of peers over a long period of time and this
approach might not be suitable for highly dynamic scenarios, typical of video related
applications. In fact, video chunks in P2P video transmission have very strict deadlines
and the set of video chunks users are interested in is usually limited and changes re-
peatedly. On the other hand, this issue may be overcome by requesting video chunks to
a larger set of peers, without expecting instant reciprocation of resources. Finally, many
alternative approaches see P2P networks as a market, where rules – such as a maximum
acceptable credit or debit – can be set in order to create a fair and stable system, where
users have incentives to cooperate.
Due to the strict deadlines previously introduced, efficient resource allocation is an-
other typical issue of these systems. In fact, cooperative users might occasionally not
be able to to reciprocate resources because they do not have anything to share. If
this behaviour repeats itself over time, these users will be considered as free-riders by
their neighbours and will receive even less data, creating a vicious circle. As the de-
signer should be able to distinguish between intentional and accidental misbehaving,
this problem needs to be tackled within the context of free-riding detection.
Finally, in most systems where there is no global user reputation, decisions taken
by single peers only depend on their own knowledge of the network, for example a
neighbour’s past behaviour. On the other hand, if there are some friendship or “trust”
relationships among users, they can share information and better identify misbehaving
peers. In the last few years the interest for social networks has grown exponentially.
They are most widely known and used as social networking sites, however, their features
can be found in other systems, such as P2P networks [9]. In these systems, each user
has a profile, which should correspond to a real identity, and establishes relationships
with other real users (such as friendship). If a peer considers this information reliable,
it can use it to have a better picture of the behaviour of its non-friends neighbours and
better distinguish between free-riders and users which have not reciprocated this peer’s
resources but have been cooperative with its friends. This approach can be vulnerable
to Sybil attacks [10], where malicious peers can generate multiple sets of identities and
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fictitious contributions between them, however, examples of systems that are resistant
with respect to these types of attacks have already been proposed in literature [11].
In summary, in this section we highlighted the main issues related to multimedia
content distribution using both client-server and P2P architectures. A possible remark
is that using a client-server approach it might be much easier to simply replicate the
data and increase the number of servers. However, as we have already mentioned, this
implies a multiplication of set-up and maintenance costs. The key motivation behind
our work is therefore that a P2P approach is much more economical than the traditional
one, as it makes use of resources that would otherwise be idle.
1.2 Objectives
Given the context introduced in the previous section, the objective of our research is
to investigate the problem of scalable video transmission over a social P2P network. In
order to achieve that, we identified the following objectives:
• To perform a subjective video quality evaluation for SVC transmission under dif-
ferent network conditions, to help with the subsequent design of P2P systems that
can handle such sequences.
• To propose algorithms for appropriate chunk and neighbour selection, specifically
designed for scalable video sequences.
• To investigate the problem of fairness in P2P networks. This is strictly related to
tackling the problem of free-riding, by designing specific policies based on peers’
contributions that users should obey, or be cut out of the system. Contribution in
this context needs to be seen in terms of debit or credit towards other peers.
• To analyse how a social-based approach to this problem (e.g. a “social P2P net-
work” [9]) can improve the resilience of our algorithms, in particular what type of
information is useful and how it can be used.
• To research how to create P2P overlay networks that allow to exploit these social-
based features.
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• To learn how to improve the overall utilisation of the network, which is related to
efficiently using the resources of the single peers.
Therefore, the aim of our work is to investigate new subjective quality-aware and credit-
based P2P models, which present social networking features, in order to achieve a system
where peers fully utilise their upload capacities and free-riding behaviour is punished.
Exchanged data will be mainly scalable video sequences.
1.3 Summary of Achievements
In this section, we illustrate the main achievements obtained in this thesis. The starting
points of our research work were the original BitTorrent protocol and – for the reasons
previously described – a custom, wavelet-based scalable video codec (WSVC), which was
developed at our institution. In particular, we focussed on issues related to providing
final users with the best possible video quality, free-riding – with and without considering
the benefits of exploiting social-based features – and network resources optimisation. The
main results presented in this document can be summarised as follows:
• We performed subjective tests to assess perceived quality in the context of scalable
video transmission over P2P under different scenarios, for both WSVC and the
standard H.264/SVC. These results were compared with objective measurements,
which showed a similar behaviour. Our subjective tests, which will be found in Sec-
tion 3.3, suggested that chunk policies requests for P2P video transmission should
aim at providing the final user with a quality that is as constant as possible, dis-
couraging variations for WSVC as well as the standard. Moreover, our test subjects
preferred to receive a higher quality at the beginning of the video, as if they were
biased by a “first impression” factor, which suggests to increase for example the
pre-buffering time of the sequence. Finally, our tests showed that the behaviour
of WSVC and the standard SVC are comparable, which indicated that our results
obtained with the wavelet-based codec are also valid for H.264/SVC.
• We designed a piece picking policy that allowed to adapt the video bit-rate re-
ceived by the final user to the available resources of the system, keeping in mind
the results obtained in our subjective video quality evaluation. We achieved that
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by using a sliding window and prioritising quality layers depending on their import-
ance; the base layer of the sequence (whose role will be explained in Section 2.3.1)
is the most critical sub-set of the bit-stream, therefore it was always downloaded
before anything else, and the other enhancement layers followed. Adaptation was
performed by shifting the window when the playback time approached. Experi-
mental evaluation under fluctuating download bandwidth, which will be illustrated
in Section 4.6.2, showed the benefits of using a scalable codec and that changes in
the chunks receiving rate corresponded to actual variations in the bit-rate of the
received video, which was comparable with the download bandwidth.
• We proposed a neighbour selection policy that only requests the base layer of the
sequence to the best peers in the network, in order to reduce the risk that this part
of the bit-stream was requested to slow peers and therefore not delivered in time.
The best peers in the network are defined as the users with the highest download
bandwidths, which alone can provide a rate that is sufficient to receive the base
layer in time. Our results, which will be explained in Section 4.6.3, showed that
activating and de-activating this policy had an impact in the number of pauses
caused by base layer chunks not being received in time, with a significant reduction
when the policy was active.
• We studied a simplified version of the problem of video transmission over P2P,
without considering many of the non-ideal aspects of a real system. We provided
an analytical solution to this reduced problem, which cannot be applied to a real
system, but provided ideas that can be applied to more complex cases. In particular,
it highlighted the problems related to having “deprived” peers in the network, which
have no data to share. As we will discuss in Section 5.2.1, we found that this is
an issue that needs to be specifically addressed in a rapidly changing context like
video transmission.
• We studied the problem of joint network resource optimisation and free-riding iden-
tification. In particular, we proposed a credit-based framework whose aim was to
promote cooperation among users – and achieve fairness by cutting out free-riders
– as well as providing more data to those users that had less, reducing their risk
of being marked as malicious. Our algorithm used a credit line mechanism, which
was the maximum accepted difference between uploaded and downloaded chunks
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before marking a peer as non-cooperative. Moreover, resource allocation was based
on two factors:
– credit factor, which indicated the current debt or credit towards a peer. Giv-
ing more importance to this factor resulted in repaying a peer’s debt more
promptly.
– deprivation factor, which depended on the potential contribution towards a
peer. A higher weight assigned to this factor encouraged a more equal chunk
distribution.
Our simulations, which will be found in Section 5.6, showed that free-riders were
effectively cut out of the system. Moreover, this approach resulted in a higher
received video bit-rate with respect to those cases when optimal resource allocation
and free-riding detection were considered as separate problems.
• We extended our previous approach by considering social-based features. We re-
laxed the constraints about the maximum acceptable credit, and introduced the
concept of social reputation, which depended on the information friend peers re-
ported about another user in the network. A peer was considered a free-rider if it
either had a low credit or a bad social reputation. Our experiments, whose outcome
will be illustrated in Section 6.4, indicated that peers in the social network could
benefit from the information from their friends by receiving an overall higher video
quality, and that our considerations about credit and deprivation factors were still
valid in this context.
• It is intuitive that if peers are connected to random users, friends have low chances
to interact with the same neighbours, especially if the network is big. As we will see
in Section 6.3.4, this is relevant, as our social reputation is based on the assumption
that friend peers can share information about peers they have both interacted with.
In order to make the impact of our approach significant, we modified the tracker
protocol to connect peers in the social network to friend users, and other potentially
uncooperative users to group of friends, which can share information about them.
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1.4 List of Publications
Most of the contributions presented in this thesis have been published in international
journals, proceedings of international conferences and workshops [12–17]. The detailed
list of publications is given below, together with another publication of ours whose
content is not described in this document [18], but whose field will be investigated for
future work.
Journals
[12] N. Ramzan, E. Quacchio, T. Zgaljic, S. Asioli, L. Celetto, E. Izquierdo, and
F. Rovati, “Peer-to-peer streaming of scalable video in future Internet applications,”
IEEE Communications Magazine, Special Issue on Future Media Internet, vol. 49,
pp. 128–135, March 2011.
[13] S. Asioli, N. Ramzan, and E. Izquierdo, “A game theoretic approach to minimum-
delay scalable video transmission over P2P,” Signal Processing: Image Communic-
ation, vol. 27, no. 5, pp. 513–521, 2012.
Conferences and Workshops
[14] S. Asioli, N. Ramzan, and E. Izquierdo, “Efficient scalable video streaming over
P2P network,” in Proceedings of the 1st International ICST Conference on User
Centric Media (UCMedia), December 2009.
[15] S. Asioli, N. Ramzan, and E. Izquierdo, “A novel technique for efficient peer-
to-peer scalable video transmission,” in Proceedings of the 2010 European Signal
Processing Conference (EUSIPCO), August 2010. Also presented at the Streaming
Day 2010 (STDAY) Workshop, September 2010.
[16] S. Asioli, N. Ramzan, and E. Izquierdo, “A game theoretic framework for op-
timal resource allocation in P2P scalable video streaming,” in Proceedings of the
2012 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing
(ICASSP), pp. 2293–2296, IEEE, 2012. Also presented at the Streaming Day 2012
(STDAY) Workshop, October 2012.
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[17] S. Asioli, N. Ramzan, and E. Izquierdo, “Exploiting social relationships for free-
riders detection in minimum-delay P2P scalable video Streaming,” in Proceedings
of the 2012 IEEE International Conference on Image Processing (ICIP), pp. 2257–
2260, IEEE, 2012.
Other Publications
[18] R. Mekuria, M. Sanna, S. Asioli, E. Izquierdo, D. Bulterman, and P. Cesar, “A
3D tele-immersion system based on live captured mesh geometry,” in Proceedings
of the ACM Multimedia Systems conference (ACM MMSys), 2013.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
The remaining chapters of this thesis are organised as follows:
Chapter 2 provides a background for our research work. More specifically, it first intro-
duces a few concepts related to subjective video quality and Quality of Experience
(QoE), BitTorrent and other P2P systems, with a particular focus on credit-based
architectures. Second, it discusses the properties of SVC and describes the main
characteristics of WSVC and H.264/SVC, used in our experimental evaluations.
Finally, it gives an overview about social networks, explaining how it is possible to
generate graphs that capture their fundamental properties.
Chapter 3 describes our subjective evaluation of scalable video transmission over P2P.
First of all, we introduce the problem of video quality assessment, the objective
metrics used in this field and present a few related studies. Second, we clarify
the methodology used in our subjective evaluation, our testing environment and
scenarios. Third, we show the outcome of both our objective and subjective evalu-
ations. Finally, we compare these results and draw conclusions that will be useful
for the design of our systems.
Chapter 4 begins with a description of a block diagram representing a general archi-
tecture for a social P2P system for scalable video transmission. Subsequently, we
introduce the problem of efficient chunk requesting in scalable video transmission
over P2P. After providing the related background, we describe our piece picking
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and neighbour selection policies and we shortly discuss their implementation. Our
experimental evaluation shows the impact of our proposed approaches on the beha-
viour of our system. Finally, we critically discuss the positive and negative aspects
of this technique.
Chapter 5 proposes an algorithm for joint free-riders detection and network resource
optimisation. We start by introducing the problem, then we discuss a simplified
version of the problem of video transmission over P2P and we propose an analyt-
ical solution. Related systems that tackle free-riding and techniques that aim at
optimal resource allocation are then described, before introducing our approach,
which is based on some of the conclusions arising from the solution to the simpli-
fied problem. A credit-based mechanism is then explained. Its aim is to identify
and cut out free-riders, while at the same time our resource allocation mechanism
tries to find the best trade-off between promptly repaying a peer’s “debts” and
uploading data to deprived peers. The chapter continues with some considerations
about the implementation of this architecture using a network simulator, our tests
and an analysis of the pros and cons of this solution.
Chapter 6 adds social networking features to the approach described in Chapter 5.
After introducing the possible benefits deriving from the use of social-based features
– such as the possibility to join forces when trying to identify free-riders – we
describe a few techniques that consider P2P networks as social networks or use a
social reputation. Subsequently, we explain our algorithm to compute a peer’s social
reputation based on the interactions it had with another peer’s set of friends. As
this approach would be ineffective without a ponderate construction of the overlay
network, we also introduce a new tracker protocol that takes social relationships
among peers into account. After showing the results of our experiments, we discuss
the strongest and weakest aspects of this solution.
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis, summarising our main contributions. Finally, we
present a few possible directions for our future research work. In particular, we
will focus on more game theory-oriented approaches, briefly introducing a new
technique based on Bayesian game theory.
Chapter 2
Background
The chapter provides some background about the context in which we developed our
research work. This is a general description, as more specific techniques will be ex-
plained in the “Related Work” section of each chapter that explains one of our proposed
architectures. The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.1 provides an
introduction to QoE and how it relates to subjective video quality; Section 2.2 gives
a general definition of P2P and discusses the history of such systems before analysing
the main concepts of BitTorrent in detail and describing a few credit-based systems;
Section 2.3 discusses the advantages of a scalable approach to video streaming, provides
a general architecture for SVC systems and briefly illustrates the two codecs used for
our experiments: WSVC and H.264/SVC; Section 2.4 introduces a few concepts related
to social networking and defines the key properties of such networks; finally, Section 2.5
concludes the chapter.
2.1 Subjective Video Quality and Quality of
Experience
According to a quite recent definition by Crespi et al. [19], in the context of multimedia
applications QoE “represents the human centric quality aspects, unlike QoS which is
merely a technology centric approach. [It] is a blue print of all human needs, desires and
perceptions concerning a service and/or product in a specific context.”
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This definition clearly states that the key aspect of QoE is that it is not necessarily
based on objective metrics, like Quality of Service (QoS), but on how the final user
perceives a certain content. Defining this quantity in the context of video transmission
over the Internet is itself a challenging task [20]. In fact, quality metrics need to consider
the application a user is interested in, as well as the impact of delivery to the final
user itself. In particular, they should capture how playback interruptions, received bit-
rate, frame rate, changes in the bit-rate and pre-buffering times affect the final user
experience. Moreover, another key aspect of Internet video is user engagement, which
can be represented for example by the percentage of a video watched by a user before
switching to something else, and which does not necessarily relate to objective metrics
that quantify how much an encoded video differs from the original sequence.
In their study, Balachandran et al. identified three key factors that explain why
assessing video QoE is an arduous challenge [20]:
• Complex Relationships: The relationship between objective metrics or para-
meters and the user experience may, under many circumstances, not be linear. For
example, higher received video bit-rates do not always result in a better user exper-
iences, especially when they result in a high number of quality switches. Another
example showing the complexity of the problem is given by the different types of
experience users might be interested in. In fact, a few subjects that were following
live events preferred to stream the video in the background while performing other
tasks and only occasionally watching it. In this case, their QoE was positively
affected by a lower received frame rate, as it resulted in a smaller computational
power needed for decoding, while the remaining computing resources could be used
for their other tasks.
• Metric Dependencies: Different parameters are often linked and improving one
aspect of the video playback might affect another one negatively. For instance,
performing bit-rate adaptation to the current download bandwidth allows to re-
duce the number of pauses or buffering, while repeated bit-rate changing might be
evaluated very negatively.
• Impact of Content: The content itself may influence the judgement of the video
quality assessors. The two main aspects considered in the study are whether the
application is live streaming or VoD, and the user’s interest in the content itself.
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The debate regarding these challenges is still open in the scientific community and
a function that accurately relates QoE or user engagement with other objective metrics
has not been accepted as standard yet. In our study in Chapter 3, we will focus on
analysing perceived video quality under different network scenarios. As in our work
we will be more focussed on measuring opinion scores of video quality rather than user
engagement, we prefer to refer to our study as subjective video quality evaluation instead
of QoE assessment.
2.2 P2P Systems
P2P networking architectures allow a range of new applications that can exploit dis-
tributed storage and parallel usage of computing resources. The following definition of
P2P [21] was given in 2001, but it is still valid nowadays:
A distributed network architecture may be called a Peer-to-Peer [...] network, if
the participants share a part of their own hardware resources (processing power,
storage capacity, network link capacity, printers,...). These shared resources
are necessary to provide the Service and content offered by the network (e.g.
file sharing or shared workspaces for collaboration). They are accessible by
other peers directly, without passing intermediary entities. The participants of
such a network are thus resource (Service and content) providers as well as
resource (Service and content) requestors (Servent-concept).
This is a very general definition and also includes systems like SETI@home [22] or
Skype [23]. In the first case, the shared resource is computational power, while in the
second it is network bandwidth. However, from now on we will only focus on P2P
systems used for file sharing.
2.2.1 A Brief History of P2P
The first popular P2P client was Napster [24], developed in 1999. It was a centralised
system, since its operation was based on a central server that kept track of all users and
available resources in the network. One year later, in 2000, Gnutella [24] was developed.
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The original system was purely decentralised, as nodes were directly connected to each
other, without the need of any central entity. This made the system robust, since failure
of any (single) node did not significantly affect the overall performance of the system.
However, Gnutella was an unstructured system, which means that there was no strict
control over network topology. As a matter of fact, in this approach it was not possible
to provide a directory service and the client itself made massive usage of flooding. As
opposite to unstructured ones, structured systems [25] have been designed over the past
few years. In these networks, nodes and data are placed according to certain rules,
with the aim of locating files in an efficient way. Queries are quick and efficient thanks
to the use of distributed routing tables. Comparison with unstructured systems has
proven structured approach to be more scalable, more reliable and fault tolerant. In
2001, creators of KaZaA [26] proposed an hybrid solution, half-way between centralised
and decentralised systems. In this system, peers are divided into two categories: regular
and super nodes. The latter have more capacity than the average nodes and are chosen
to perform additional functionalities like keeping track of peers and data in a certain
portion of the network and keeping a list of other super nodes. Queries are only per-
formed through these special peers, using therefore “intelligent” flooding. A significant
improvement is represented by BitTorrent, which deserves a special mention, as it is the
starting point of all our proposed techniques.
2.2.2 BitTorrent
BitTorrent is a game theory-based P2P protocol developed by Bram Cohen in 2003 [1]
and the main idea behind it is that users’ download rates should be proportional to their
upload rates, in order to provide a fair mechanism and motivate users to share more.
Free-riding is occasionally accepted, but only if there is enough spare capacity in the sys-
tem. Ever since it was designed, several major improvements have been added, in order
to eliminate single points of failure and add new features like Video on Demand (VoD)
or live video streaming. BitTorrent protocol is thoroughly described in this chapter, as
it will be the starting point of our architectures described in Chapter 4, 5 and 6.
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Base Working Principles
If a user wants to publish one or more files in BitTorrent, it should create a torrent file.
It contains information such as size, name of these files, some checksums and the address
of a tracker, which is a server that helps peers interested in a certain content find each
other. Moreover, files are split into several pieces of a fixed size, which can be typically
picked from a 32 kilobytes to 2 megabytes range. Each piece is associated with an ID
and a SHA1 hash, which is written in the torrent in order to check integrity of the piece
once it has been downloaded – and tackle the issue of pollution. BitTorrent transfers
data using the Transport Control Protocol (TCP) and, to improve overall performance
of the system and avoid delays, each peer should have an optimum number of requests
pending at the same time. Pieces are cut into sub-pieces and typically five requests are
pipelined at once. When a new sub-piece is received, another request is sent. The user
that publishes a file becomes a seeder for that particular file and other peers, which are
called leechers in this case, can download from it. A peer interested in that file should
download the associated .torrent file and contact the tracker, which provides it with a
partial list of users that own all or part of it. When a leecher completes its download, it
becomes a seeder and the set of all seeders and leechers is called a swarm. An important
remark is that in general BitTorrent clients will not allow users to search for torrents,
which can be located on ordinary web servers or can be exchanged in many other ways.
Piece Picking
In the previous section, division of pieces into sub-pieces was mentioned. The general
rule is that a piece should be completed before requesting sub-pieces belonging to other
chunks, in order to have complete pieces as soon as possible. In fact, pieces will not be
shared until their download is terminated. This policy is called strict priority and it is
the main rule that any BitTorrent client should obey. Under these circumstances, the
main issue becomes choosing which new piece to pick for downloading. All BitTorrent
clients keep track of which pieces are owned by their connected neighbours and sort
them according to number of occurrences; in this context rarest pieces are considered
more interesting and are chosen first. This behaviour has many advantages:
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• If the original seeder for a specific content leaves the P2P network after a short time,
it is more likely that at least one complete copy is transmitted – even if to different
users – using this technique, instead of selecting pieces at random. Therefore, the
full content remains available to the users even after the original peer has left.
• Similarly, if a piece is owned by only a few peers, it will be picked first, since the
probability that these peers disconnect and therefore the piece is lost is quite high.
• If a piece is extremely rare, other users might be interested in it, which means that
other peers might download it once it is owned by a peer. Since download band-
width is proportional to upload bandwidth, owning rare pieces will grant higher
download rates from other peers.
An exception to this rule is represented by the first piece, which is chosen at random.
Since this piece is downloaded without giving anything in exchange, it is important that
it is downloaded as soon as possible, in order to have something to share. In this case
downloading a rare piece is not convenient, since it might be owned by just one peer
and transfer could be slow. Therefore, pieces are randomly selected until one complete
piece is received. After that, the policy switches to rarest first.
In the final part of the download, when all the missing sub-pieces are being requested,
the protocol enters the so-called endgame mode. This should be a very short period,
in order to avoid wasting resources, and it consists of requesting all these missing sub-
pieces from all the neighbours. When a sub-piece arrives, all the other requests for it
are cancelled. The reason for this is that, if a peer downloads its last sub-pieces from
another peer which has very slow transfer rates, it has to wait for an unnecessarily long
time. With this technique, instead, downloads are completed very quickly, while usage
of extra resources is minimal.
Choking and Unchoking Algorithms
Since in BitTorrent there is no such thing as central resource allocation, each peer has
to work independently to maximise its own performance. What happens in practice is
that each peer tries to download from all the peers that will allow them to, while choking
or unchoking (uploading to or refusing to upload to) other peers. All the algorithms
that can be used should try to reach Pareto efficiency [8]. In computer science, this
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is an algorithm that tries to reach global optimum by maximising the profit of every
single peer. Since peers will mostly upload to peers that are “generous” towards them,
this algorithm is called tit-for-tat (T4T). In practice, each peer has a fixed number of
unchoked neighbours, typically four, and the problem that the algorithm tries to solve
is deciding which peers to unchoke. The default behaviour is uploading to peers that
give something in exchange, but if there are some free connections they are used to
unchoke random peers, to “explore the network” and try to find better peers. If all the
connections are used, instead, all peers will be sorted and unchoked according to their
upload rates, except for one, which will be optimistically unchoked. This means that one
peer is unchoked regardless of its upload rate. An exception to this rule is represented
by BitTorrent’s anti-snubbing policy. In fact, if a peer does not receive a piece from
another peer in over a minute, it assumes it is being snubbed by the other peer and will
refuse to unchoke it, except by optimistic unchoking. Most of the times this strategy
leads to more than one peer being optimistically unchoked and helps a peer find better
neighbours more quickly.
When a leecher becomes a seeder, it is of course no longer interested in earning a
profit from any exchange and it simply uploads to the peers that have higher transfer
rates, in order to maximise the download rate of the entire system. The assumption
behind this strategy is that high download rates will imply high upload rates to other
users. A potential limitation is that, however, not having a feedback from these users,
seeders might be uploading data to free-riders. It is also worth mentioning that according
to a study by Piatek et al. [27] incentives provided by the BitTorrent protocol are not
robust enough, as peers can improve their utility by unilaterally changing their strategy.
In this study, a modified BitTorrent client called BitTyrant is proposed. The strategy
followed by BitTyrant peers differs from the original protocol in terms of size of unchoked
peers set and amount of contribution towards them. The modified algorithm will try
to find peers that reciprocate resources in exchange of a lower upload bandwidth, and
increase the number of unchoked peers until the benefit of an additional unchoked user
is outweighed by the lower resource reciprocation probability from other peers.
In the next section, we will analyse a different approach to resource reciprocation,
which considers P2P as a market.
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2.2.3 Credit-based P2P Systems
The T4T strategy implemented by BitTorrent requires that two peers exchange data in
both directions at the same time, and this mechanism works well when the chunks that
are being transmitted belong to a very large set. On the other hand, in the context of
video transmission peers are interested in the chunks that immediately follow a certain
playback position, which represents a much smaller set. Alternative approaches to T4T
consider P2P system from a more economic-oriented point of view by introducing credit-
based systems. These are systems that model P2P networks in terms of resources that
users can trade and peers are associated with a reputation, which depends on their
behaviour in the network.
A Barter-based Solution
In 2006, Peserico proposed a market-oriented P2P architecture based on barter [28].
One of the most interesting properties of this system is wealth storage. That is, a
perishable good can be traded for something that has a value which remains constant
over time. An example of goods that lose value quickly in this context is represented
by P2P video chunks, as they are of no use once their playback time has passed. In the
proposed solution, such resource can be traded in exchange for the promise of future
commodities. The main challenge is represented by ensuring that this promise will be
kept, however, this can be achieved by offering peers an incentive, such as learning what
the other user has gained from the exchange.
For example, let us suppose that there are two peers in the network, A and B, which
simultaneously barter one unit of two commodities a and b. Supposing that A would
have been willing to trade 1+ units of a in exchange for 1 unit of b and that symmetrical
assumptions apply to B, both peers have gained a surplus and have de facto opened a
credit line with each other. Peer A can therefore now borrow an additional  of b, and
B will not experience loss even if the other peer does not give anything in exchange (as
B would have been willing to trade 1 +  of b in exchange for 1 unit of a in any case).
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Karma and Reputation-based Schemes
Vishnumurthy et al. propose a system based on karma [29], which is a parameter ana-
logous to user reputation that depends on how well a peer has behaved towards the rest
of the community. Despite it being a global parameter, such solution has been designed
for completely decentralised systems. Therefore, karma values are stored by other nodes,
also called Bank nodes and peers act both as content consumers and guardians for other
nodes. Information is heavily replicated to achieve fault tolerance and resistance to collu-
sion attacks. Nevertheless, this system is also vulnerable to phenomena like discrepancy
between the karma reported by different nodes due to lack of synchronisation.
We denote with BankA the set of nodes responsible for tracking the transactions
involving node A and storing A’s karma. When A is interested in a specific content
from another node B, both nodes need to agree on a price, which could be for example
the result of a bidding process. Karma transfers need to be fair and preserve the total
amount. Therefore, in this specific example, the karma of A should be reduced of the
same amount as the one of B is increased. As this process is vulnerable to tampering,
this is achieved through a provable transfer of karma from A to B, followed by another
provable transfer of data from B to A. This operation is performed through the aid of
BankA and BankB, which supervise the operations through the exchange of messages.
When nodes in the bank sets disagree, a majority vote is called.
An important observation the authors make is that peers can be free-riders not
only in terms of refusing to upload data to other users, which can overcome by only
allowing users with a positive karma to send requests, but also in terms of refusing to
act as banking nodes from other peers, while using the services provided by other users.
Finally, this system proposes to be a distributed but global reputation mechanism. The
reliability of the system comes at the expenses of complexity, and the system is still
vulnerable to collusion attacks when a node creates several identities and these peers
become its guardians.
On the other hand, the solution proposed by Gupta et al. is a global reputation-
based scheme which relies on a reputation computation agent [30]. In this system, a peer
K can increase its credit and its debit by performing different actions and its reputation
depends on different factors:
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• Query-Response Credit, which is awarded to a peer just by being online and
replying to queries from other users.
• Upload Credit, proportional to the contribution a user has given to the rest of the
network. This value also considers the fraction of its bandwidth a peer is sharing.
• Sharing Credit, which depends on the amount of shared content. This quantity
has been introduced to give credit to those peers that offer hard to find content
and because of this do not get much upload credit.
• Download Debit, increased by downloading a file from another user.
A peer’s reputation is given by the sum of all its credit components minus its debit
component. The authors also propose another model, where the debit component is not
considered, but credit expires. Reputation can subsequently be used by other peers as
an aid for their decisions regarding resource allocation.
The systems described in this section rely on a global reputation, and need to ad-
dress the problem of estimating this parameter correctly. Moreover, they represent very
generic architectures and have not been specifically designed for video transmission.
However, concepts introduced here, like debit and credit, will be used in Chapter 5 and
Chapter 6 in the description of our proposed approaches.
2.3 Scalable Video Coding
The most important aspect of SVC is the possibility to encode a sequence once and
decode it many times, in many different ways, according to specific application require-
ments. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to modify the traditional encoding and
decoding scheme. Moreover, it is also necessary to define which types of scalability we
want to use. First of all, we will introduce some general concepts about SVC, and second
we will briefly describe the main characteristics of two codecs we used for our studies;
they are based on two different tools: DCT [4] and wavelet transform [6].
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2.3.1 SVC Modules
A SVC architecture consists of three modules: encoder, extractor and decoder [31]. The
whole scheme is shown in Figure 2.1. The encoder takes an uncompressed YUV sequence
as input and produces a scalable bit-stream and its description as output. YUV indicates
that each frame of the original sequence is represented by its luminance component (Y)
and two crominance components (U and V). The resulting description can be either
interleaved within the encoded video sequence or stored in a separate stream, e.g. a text
file. The whole sequence has a very high quality, and compression in some cases can
even be lossless.
Figure 2.1 shows that different qualities and spatial resolutions can be interleaved
in the bit-stream. Light blue data is associated to small spatial resolution, while dark
blue bit-stream parts correspond to a higher resolution. These are further divided into
smaller parts, that correspond to different qualities. If the extractor completely removes
the dark blue parts, the output will be a high-quality sequence with a small spatial
resolution. On the other hand, if the extractor truncates both light and dark blue data,
this operation will result in a high-resolution video with a low quality. Finally, the green
part represents the base layer of the sequence, which is the only part that cannot be
truncated.
The extractor has in general very low complexity. It produces another scalable se-
quence, which can be further truncated. Finally, the decoder converts the extracted
video back to YUV format, performing operations that are symmetric with respect to
the encoder.
2.3.2 Scalability Functionalities
Video extraction, which also takes the name of video adaptation, should be done in a
very simple manner, for example parsing the bit-stream and removing the unwanted
parts. To achieve that, it is necessary to encode the video in such a way that different
bit-stream parts are encoded in a hierarchical fashion with respect to the video para-
meters we want to scale. It is possible to define three basic types of scalability: spatial,
temporal and quality [31]. The latter can also be referred to as SNR (Signal-to-Noise
Ratio) scalability. We have spatial scalability when there exists a subset of the original
Background 22
Original Video 
Sequence
SVC
Encoder
Base
Layer
Residual
Data
Encoded
Bit-stream
SVC
Extractor
SVC
Extractor
Lower
Quality
(SNR)
Lower
Spatial
Resolution
Figure 2.1: Building blocks of a generic SVC system.
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sequence that allows to reconstruct the video with a smaller spatial resolution. Tem-
poral scalability holds if a (different) subset corresponds to a lower frame rate version
of the sequence. Finally, in order to achieve SNR scalability, different subsets of the
video should allow its reconstruction with different qualities. These properties can also
be combined; for example, given an original sequence that has 4CIF resolution (704 ×
576 pixels, corresponding to four times the CIF – or Common Intermediate Format –
resolution) and a rate of 30 frames per second (fps), it could be possible to extract a
CIF version of the video (352 × 288 pixels) with 15 fps and a lower quality. An example
of the original sequence and scaled sequences is shown in Figure 2.2.
2.3.3 WSVC, a Wavelet-based SVC
Wavelet-based Encoder
Differences between scalable video codec architectures lie in the design of encoding and
decoding modules. However, since the decoder simply performs operations that are
inverse with respect to the encoder, it will not be described in this section. The scalable
video codec used in our proposed approaches is being developed by Multimedia and
Vision Research Group (MMV) at Queen Mary University of London since 2006 [32].
Its encoder module can be divided into two blocks: the first one calculates a spatial-
temporal transformation of the sequence, while the second one performs the optimal
truncation of the bit-stream.
The aim of spatial transforms of images is to compact their energy and de-correlate
their content, making their compression simpler and more efficient. A peculiar aspect of
the wavelet transform – which this codec is based on – is that it is applied to the whole
image at once. In video compression, these concepts are extended to a third dimension
(time), in order to exploit temporal correlation between frames.
In WSVC, Spatial-Temporal (ST) decomposition consists of two steps: a motion
compensated temporal filtering (MCTF) [33] and a 2D discrete wavelet transform. They
provide, respectively, temporal and spatial scalability. These two operations are neces-
sarily performed separately, which allows a degree of freedom. In fact, temporal decom-
position can either be performed before the spatial one (t+2D scheme) or after it (2D+t
scheme). Decomposition of one level is equivalent to the operation of analysis. The pro-
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Figure 2.3: A ST decomposition tree for t+2D decomposition [32].
cess reversing the decomposition is reconstruction, where a one level reconstruction is
equivalent to the operation of synthesis.
ST decomposition can be represented by an ST tree structure [31,32]. This is shown in
Figure 2.3 for two temporal and two spatial levels of transform. Here, T and S denote one
step of the temporal and spatial decomposition, respectively. Each level of decomposition
creates a node in the ST tree, called an ST node. To perform reconstruction of the video
sequence at the decoder’s side, the data contained in the leaves of the ST tree has to be
transmitted. In the following the leaves of an ST tree will be referred to as ST sub-bands.
Each ST sub-band is represented with 2D coordinates corresponding to its temporal (T)
and spatial resolution (S), which is denoted as (T, S). By convention, a lower value of
the coordinate corresponds to a lower value of the spatial or temporal resolution.
In order to achieve quality scalability, wavelet coefficients are bit-plane [34] encoded.
Since the result of a ST wavelet transform is a set of transformed frames, bit-plane en-
coding can be performed on a frame-to-frame basis by using algorithms developed for
scalable coding of still images. This algorithm applies successive approximation quant-
isation (SAQ) on the wavelet coefficients generated by the 3D wavelet transform in order
to encode them progressively, from the most significant bit (MSB) to the least significant
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bit (LSB). This operation results in a video sequence that has optimal distortion at the
specified spatial and temporal resolutions, given an appropriate set of target bit-rates.
Bit-stream Description and Extraction
Adaptation to lower fidelity content, (i.e. quality, spatial or temporal resolution) can
be performed by simply removing those parts of the bit-stream that represent a higher
fidelity of the video with respect to the targeted one. For adaptation of the scalable
bit-stream, an extractor can be used.
In order to achieve efficient extraction, a WSVC bit-stream consists of data pack-
ets called atoms [31]. An atom represents the smallest entity that can be added to or
removed from the bit-stream, and groups of atoms form layers. Following such organisa-
tion, the extractor simply discards from the bit-stream the group of atoms that are not
needed to achieve the desired resolution. For an easier interpretation of the extraction
process, the bit-stream can be represented in a 3D Temporal resolution, Spatial resol-
ution, Quality (T,S,Q) space, as shown in Figure 2.4 for example of tl = sl = ql = 2.
tl, sl, ql are the number of refinement layers in the quality, temporal and spatial domains
respectively. With the exception of refinement layers, in each domain there exists a basic
layer which is denoted as 0th layer and cannot be removed from the bit-stream. There-
fore, in the example shown in Figure 2.4 we have 3 quality, 3 temporal and 3 spatial
layers. Each atom has its coordinates in T-S-Q space, which are denoted by (T,S,Q).
If (i, j, k) represents the desired quality, temporal and spatial resolution of the adapted
video, where i ∈ 0, 1, . . . , tl, j ∈ 0, 1, . . . , sl and k ∈ 0, 1, . . . , ql, then, in the extraction
process, the atoms with coordinates T > i, S > j,Q > k are simply discarded from the
bit-stream. In Figure 2.4, the atoms that are highlighted are the ones remaining in the
final bit-stream after the extraction process for which i = j = k = 1.
A high-level description of the WSVC bit-stream is illustrated in Figure 2.5. The
bit-stream begins with the main header, which contains parameters that define general
information about the encoded video. The most notable ones are spatial resolution,
frame rate and number of spatial, temporal and quality layers. Then, an optional header
follows. It is composed of parameters that define more advanced encoding settings, such
as motion block size or type of wavelet transform. The remaining part of the bit-
stream is divided into Groups Of Pictures (GOPs) of the encoded video. A GOP is the
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Figure 2.4: 3D representation of a scalable video bit-stream.
basic unit of input video on which the scalability is imposed, and for which a (T,S,Q)
representation can be used. Each GOP has a header with parameters that describe some
general information about that GOP. The GOP header is followed by its payload, which
is divided into atoms. Each atom contains a tag specifying its size, motion vector and
texture information. Since the size of the atoms is not constant, the number of bytes
that an atom tag occupies in the bit-stream varies as well; its minimum size is 1 byte
and the maximum is 4 bytes.
During the extraction process, the WSVC extractor internally creates a (T,S,Q)
representation of the bit-stream shown in Figure 2.4. That representation only exists
in the memory of the extractor. Along with the (T,S,Q) coordinates of the atoms, it
also contains information about the starting byte and length of the particular atom.
Therefore, for each atom, the extractor knows on which byte in the bit-stream it starts
and how big it is. Based on that information, when an atom has to be discarded, the
extractor simply removes the corresponding part of the bit-stream and concatenates the
remaining parts with the previous one. An important remark is that WSVC supports
fine granularity. In other words, instead of extracting a specific number of quality layers,
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Figure 2.5: High level description of a scalable video bit-stream.
it is possible to specify the bit-rate of the extracted video. However, the SNR of the
video might not be optimal for this specific bit-rate, since, as we previously mentioned,
it is optimised with respect to some extraction points.
2.3.4 H.264/SVC, the Scalable Extension of H.264/AVC
H.264/SVC [5] has been standardised as the scalable extension of H.264/AVC [35]. The
design of these codecs concerns both a Video Coding Layer (VCL) and a Network Ab-
straction Layer (NAL). The first one is responsible for the generation of the coded
bit-stream, whereas the second formats this data and generates the respective headers,
in order to allow exploitation of the functionalities of the codecs. Encoded bit-streams
consist of several NAL units, made of a header and a payload. These units can be either
VCL NAL – containing coded data such as slices – or non-VCL NAL, the most import-
ant of which contains parameter sets. In general, scalability is obtained by discarding
the desired NAL units and reconstructing the video with the remaining data.
The VCL follows a block-based hybrid approach [35], similarly to other codecs like
MPEG-2 [36] and H.263 [37]. The division of frames into smaller coding units follows
the partition into slices (parts of the frame that do not depend on any other region of
the same frame) and macroblocks, typically made of 16 × 16 luma and 8 × 8 chroma
samples (if the sampling format is 4:2:0 [38]). The codec supports three types of slices,
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Figure 2.6: Inter and intra-layer prediction dependencies for spatial scalability.
whose difference lies in the information they require for their decoding and the slices
they depend on:
• I-slices: coding is intra-picture only and uses spatial interpolation from neighbour-
ing areas within the same slice.
• P-slices: both intra and inter-picture coding, where the prediction only depends
on one other signal.
• B-slices: similar to P-slices, however the prediction is the weighted average of two
signals (e.g. a “past” signal and a “future” one).
The residual signal (prediction error) is transformed with a filtering that is very similar
to DCT, quantised and finally subjected to entropy coding.
Temporal Scalability
As far as temporal scalability is concerned, it is obtained by imposing constraints on
the slices that are used as reference for motion compensation. For example, let t be a
temporal layer identifier varying between t0 and tN , where ti+1 denotes higher temporal
resolution with respect to ti. Predictions of slices belonging to ti can only be made from
those with a temporal index k < i. In general these predictions can be generated using
more than one reference, as in H.264/AVC, and it is possible to avoid the usage of future
slices.
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Spatial Scalability
In order to obtain spatial scalability, this codec uses the traditional multi-layer coding
approach. That is, in addition to intra-frame prediction and motion compensation inside
each layer, inter-layer prediction is also used, as shown in Figure 2.6. For an enhancement
layer frame, the reconstructed prediction can be generated by using motion compensation
techniques inside the layer, by upsampling a lower layer frame or calculating an average
between the upsampled and temporal prediction. The figure also shows how spatial and
temporal scalability can be combined.
Quality Scalability
Quality scalability can be seen as a particular case of spatial scalability where two layers
q0 and q1 have the same frame size and therefore no upsampling is required. For different
layers, different quantisation step sizes are also used when encoding the residual. This
case is known as Coarse-Grain quality Scalability (CGS) and as the name suggests only
allows a limited number of decoding points. In order to achieve Medium-Grain quality
Scalability (MGS) the concept of key picture is introduced. An issue that may be
encountered when decoding scalable sequences is drift. It is the lack of synchronisation
between motion-compensated prediction loops at the encoding and decoding sides. For
a subset of frames, the key pictures, the motion vectors used to generate the prediction
must be the same for all layers. Moreover, a flag is also transmitted, which indicates
which frame has been used as reference to generate the prediction. Using this technique
allows to have more flexibility on the extraction points, hence the MGS, as it allows to
split the information more efficiently in the different NAL units.
2.3.5 Final Remarks about SVC
Both WSVC and H.264/SVC allow a layered representation of the video bit-stream. In
fact, it is sufficient that the corresponding atoms or NAL units are grouped according
to any of the scalability parameters. Therefore, if a user wants to exploit only one type
of scalability, such as quality, it is possible to assume the sequence to be divided into
GOPs and quality layers, as shown in Figure 2.7. Layer q0, which is the base layer
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Figure 2.7: Structure of scalable video bit-stream when only quality scalability is considered;
the video sequence is divided into GOPs and layers.
– corresponding to a Low quality in Figure 2.7 – needs to be completely received to
decode a certain GOP. Therefore, it is the most critical part of the bit-stream. All the
other layers are enhancement layers and they are used to improve the received video
quality. If this representation of the sequence is used and layers have the same bit-rate,
the only differences in the codecs as seen from the outside lie in compression efficiency
and subjective quality perceived by the final user, which will be analysed in the next
chapter. An important remark is that SVC technologies will be used throughout the
rest of this thesis, from Chapter 3 to Chapter 6.
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2.4 Introduction to Social Networks
Social networking sites contribute nowadays to an important share of the Internet traffic.
For example, the biggest social network, Facebook1, as of early 2013 counts over 1 billion
active members [39]. They can be defined as web-based services that allow users to [40]:
• construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system,
• articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection,
• view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within
the system.
An important aspect emerging from this definition that can be applied to P2P is that,
as we will see, creating a user profile contributes to the de-anonymisation of the network
and this might be an incentive for users not to cheat [9]. Moreover, if users share a
connection, they have the faculty to exchange information with the others, especially
friends or in general peers they trust. An important remark is that friendship on a social
network does not necessarily mean an actual connection in real life. Moreover, recent
studies indicate that a significant percentage of profiles on Facebook (nearly 9% in 2012)
are fake [41], therefore trust in social networks cannot always be implied. However, in
principle, misbehaviour of a friend user is easily identifiable [9] and such users can be
removed from the set of trusted peers.
Another characteristic that is peculiar of social networks is their topology, which
can be defined as small-world [42]. That is, a few users have a number of connections
that is significantly higher than the rest of the network and the maximum degree of
separation between two random nodes in the network is small (if we assume all the
nodes to be connected). In the real world, according to an old study [43], if two random
persons are selected they will be connected (in the majority of the cases) by at most 5
intermediaries. This theory is more commonly known as six degrees of separation. It
is however outdated, as a more recent study [44] performed on the network of active
Facebook users indicates that the average number of nodes between two users is 3.74,
suggesting at most four intermediaries, with small variations when national sub-graphs
are considered.
1https://www.facebook.com/
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(a) Regular, p = 0 (b) Small-world, p = 0.5 (c) Completely Random, p = 1
Figure 2.8: Effects of rewiring probability p on the topology of a Watts-Strogatz graph.
In 1998, Watts and Strogatz proposed a method to generate these type of graphs [42].
First of all, let N be the number of vertices and K the number of edges per vertex, the
algorithm generates a ring lattice where each node is connected to K/2 neighbours on
each side. Second, each edge is rewired at random with a probability p. Figure 2.82
shows that p influences the properties of the graph, from perfectly regular to completely
random, whereas small world networks lie in between. A requirement for the parameters
used in the graph generator is expressed in Eq. (2.1):
N  K  ln(N) 1, (2.1)
where K  ln(N) is required to obtain a connected graph.
This model can be used to generate networks with a small world topology, however
it shows some limitations. First of all, the degree sequence of the generated graph is not
power-law; that is, the number of nodes with degree κ is not proportional to κ−β for any
β > 0 [46], as expected for large κ from a real social network. Second, the model is not
able to capture the property of densification [47] over time. This is a phenomenon that
consists in an increase of the average degree of a graph as time passes. It also follows a
power-law pattern; that is, given the number of nodes over time n(t) and the number of
edges over time e(t), e(t) ∝ n(t)α, with 1 < α < 2. Nevertheless, this model has been
used in our approach in Chapter 6 due to its simplicity and as a starting point for future
work, where more realistic models will be considered.
2These figures have been generated with Pajek [45] software.
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Albert et al. proposed an algorithm to generate scale-free networks [46]. The starting
point of their work is the consideration that most real-world networks represent systems
that grow over time with the addition of new nodes. Moreover, the probability that a
connection is rewired in the original Watts-Strogatz model does not take into account
the fact that the probability of connecting to a node should also depend on the node’s
degree; in other words, it should show a preferential attachment to those nodes that are
already popular and therefore have a high degree.
The algorithm works as follows: the starting point is a small set of nodes consisting
of n0 elements. At each step, a new node is added and e new connections are created
(with e < n0). These new connections, however, are not created randomly, but the
probability Π that the new node connects to a node i depends on its degree κi and it
satisfies the property expressed in Eq. (2.2).
Π(κi) =
κi∑
j
κj
. (2.2)
It is intuitive to see that after t steps, this model generates a network that consists of
n0 + t nodes and e · t edges. Numerical simulations indicate that the probability that a
node has κ connections follows a power-law with β = 3. Finally, as the total number of
edges e ∝ n, this model does not take densification into account.
On the other hand, Leskovec et al. presented an approach called forest fire model [47].
Let us suppose that there already exists a small graph consisting of n0 users and a new
node i wants to connect to it. First of all, it connects to an ambassador node j, creating
a link to it. The second step consists in generating two random variables, x and y
geometrically distributed and depending on forward and backward burning probability.
Node i then selects x out-links and y in-links of j, connecting to the x+ y nodes on the
other side of them. This step is repeated considering the in- and out-links of these new
neighbours, however nodes cannot be visited more than once.
Graphs generated using this algorithm present a few interesting properties. First of
all, it allows newcomers to connect to popular nodes quickly no matter which node they
select as ambassador, according to the “rich gets richer” paradigm, which can also be
found in [46]. Second, it facilitates the generation of “communities”, as new users tend to
replicate the social circle of their ambassadors and their connections. Finally, it satisfies
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Topic Where it can be found
Subjective Video Evaluation: Chapter 3
Peer-to-Peer:
P2P Transmission Chapter 4 to Chapter 6
Credit-based P2P Chapter 5 and Chapter 6
Scalable Video Coding:
H.264/SVC Chapter 3
WSVC Chapter 3 to Chapter 6
Social Networks: Chapter 6
Table 2.1: Summary of cross-references for background topics.
the aforementioned densification power law property and the diameter of the network
shrinks as the number of users increase. That is, the maximum distance between two
random nodes in the network decreases when more users join the network.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter we provided background information about QoE and subjective video
quality, P2P networking including BitTorrent and credit-based systems, SVC and social
networks. These are the elements our work has been built on, and a more detailed
summary of where they can be found later on in this thesis is shown in Table 2.1. In
the next chapters, more specific techniques that are relevant to our contributions will
also be explained. Before that, Chapter 3 will illustrate our objective and subjective
evaluations of WSVC and H.264/SVC over P2P.
Chapter 3
Subjective Video Quality Evaluation
of SVC over P2P
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the performance of two scalable codecs – WSVC
and the standard H.264/SVC – under different static and dynamic network conditions
in terms of subjective quality, and study how this relates to objective metrics1. The rest
of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.1 explains the motivation behind this
study and provides some related background. Section 3.2 describes the methodology
used for our evaluation, in particular: the test sequences, environment, types of tests
the subjects had to perform and the different P2P scenarios. Section 3.3 shows both
objective (in terms of objective quality, assessed with metrics widely used in the scientific
community) and subjective results of our experiments. Finally, Section 3.4 concludes
the chapter, discussing the importance of these results in the design of P2P systems.
3.1 Motivation and Related Work
As the final users of digital content are actual persons and not machines, objective met-
rics used to determine video quality only give a partial assessment of how a video is
actually perceived by the Human Visual System (HVS). Therefore, in the field of multi-
media applications the necessity to carry out rigorous subjective tests for the assessment
of video quality has arisen. These tests require a sufficient number of subjects and need
1The research work presented in this chapter has been developed within the FP7 project Saracen [48–
52]. However, the subjective evaluation has been re-run.
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to be carried out in a controlled environment, in order to guarantee the validity of the
results and their reproducibility. In addition to this, test materials should be selected
to cover several types of content and tests should be designed to reduce the impact of
human bias to a minimum.
Objective metrics are used to express mathematically how much the original signal
differs from the compressed one, in order to evaluate the performance of the encoding
algorithm. Two very common tools used for objective video quality assessment are the
Mean Squared Error (MSE) and the Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR), which will be
described in detail in Section 3.3.1. A few studies [53, 54] indicate that there is not
perfect correspondence between these metrics and how the HVS perceives video quality,
especially if compression introduces artefacts. Several studies, which try to model the
behaviour of the HVS [55, 56], have been proposed in the attempt to find a correlation
between objective and subjective metrics. However, none of these models have proven
to be fully reliable under a wide range of circumstances. Therefore, as both MSE and
PSNR represent nowadays the most commonly used tools to evaluate the performance
of video compression techniques, it is important to find in which cases these objective
metrics can also be used to estimate how the HVS perceives a visual stimulus.
The study in [57] proposes a function that correlates objective and subjective metrics,
expressed by Eq. (3.1):
QoE = e−ciMSE, (3.1)
where the optimal value of ci, found experimentally, is 8.05× 10−3. This function, how-
ever, does not always prove to be accurate, especially for different frame sizes and frame
rates. In our study, we will conduct both types of tests and we will draw conclusions
based on the significance of our experimental evaluation. However, it is out of the scope
of this research work to model a function that correlates these two types of metrics.
As far as our subjective tests are concerned, international standards [58, 59] can
provide guidelines to define such test activities. Tests can be classified according to the
types of stimuli the subjects are presented with and fall into three categories:
• double stimulus: subjects are presented with a reference and a test stimulus
sequentially. It can be required to rate the test only or both stimuli;
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MOS Quality Impairment
5 Excellent Imperceptible
4 Good Perceptible but not annoying
3 Fair Slightly annoying
2 Poor Annoying
1 Bad Very annoying
Table 3.1: Mean Opinion Score
• single stimulus: only a test stimulus is shown and the subject is asked to rate it;
• stimulus comparison: both stimuli are shown and the subject is required to
assess relative quality.
Ratings can be expressed on a continuous or discrete scale, can be numerical or cat-
egorical (e.g. very bad to excellent) and represent the quality or impairment perceived
by the subject when presented with the corresponding stimulus. The most commonly
used metric used for subjective tests is Mean Opinion Score (MOS), defined by the
standard [58,59] and shown in Table 3.1 for the discrete case. Stimuli subjective evalu-
ation can be performed while this is being presented to the subjects or at the end of the
test sequence, in order to assess the impact of variations in the quality. Based on the
degrees of freedom previously introduced, several types of assessments can be defined.
For example, DSCQS represents a double stimulus continuous quality scale test, where
an encoded test sequence and its reference are shown sequentially and the procedure is
repeated twice. Ranking is performed after the second round and the difference between
the MOS – expressed on a continuous scale from 0 to 100 – of the reference and com-
pressed videos is calculated. Another method is DSCS, which means double stimulus
comparison scale. It is similar to the previous test, the main differences being that both
stimuli are shown only once and that a discrete scale is used.
Different types of tests are used for different purposes. For example, stimulus com-
parison immediately highlights the artefacts introduced by video compression, and it
is used to evaluate the performance of the video codec regardless of its specific applic-
ations. On the other hand, double stimulus is more similar to a video transmission
context, where the reference is not transmitted. Therefore, we used the latter approach
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Ref. Codec(s) Sequences Subjects Methodology
[61] MPEG-4 4 120 SC
[62] H.263 5 20 DSIS
[63] H.264/SVC 6 30 DSCQS
[64] H.264/SVC 8 20 ACR
[65] H.264/SVC, WSVC 3 16 SC
Table 3.2: Summary of related studies for scalable video codecs.
for our tests. However, we did not use a single stimulus as in the double stimulus case
the difference between the perceived quality of the received and uncompressed video is
more evident, making this test less vulnerable to the perceived quality of the original
sequence.
The guidelines [58,59] also provide tools to compensate for differences between sub-
jects and calculate average MOSs and their corresponding confidence intervals. Other
statistical tools can be used for a more thorough analysis of the data and comparison
of results. An important remark is that subjective tests with scalable videos are usually
performed to assess perceived quality and impairment associated to quality scalability.
The main question is what is the minimum threshold for video quality to be considered as
acceptable, and the answer depends on many parameters, such as content, type of applic-
ation and viewers. The main studies regarding scalability for MPEG-4 [60], H.263 [37],
H.264/SVC [5] and wavelet-based WSVC [32] are reported in Table 3.2, where SC is
stimulus comparison, DSIS is double stimulus impairment scale and ACR is absolute
category rating.
More specifically, [61] proposes an optimal adaptation trajectory to adapt video para-
meters to the current network conditions in order to maximise the perceived video qual-
ity. In fact, there are many possible choices to decrease a video bit-rate in case of a
reduction in the current available resources: for example, video frame rate and frame
size can be downgraded individually or at the same time and there are a large number
of configurations that result in videos lying in the same zone of equal average bit-rate.
Therefore, the authors propose a path in the (frame rate, frame size) space, which the
adapting module should follow when choosing the video parameters, corresponding, as
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said, to the minimum perceived impairment for a specific bit-rate. An important remark
is that this trajectory also depends on the content of the video itself. Similarly, the study
in [62] assesses video quality at low bit-rates, identifying equal MOS contours either in
a (frame rate, frame size) or a (SNR, frame rate) space, concluding that the quality
depends on the video content and that a small frame size is usually preferred under this
low bit-rate constraint.
The authors of [63] propose a study on subjective video quality for mobile devices,
analysing the impact of degradation in the spatial, temporal and SNR domain, showing
how different types of sequences are affected. For example, the authors found that
a cartoon sequence is not significantly affected by a frame rate reduction. They also
identified a few scaling order preferences associated to different type of content. For
instance, for a sequence showing a Sports event, the subjects preferred a reduction in
the frame rate to a SNR degradation. The authors justified this phenomenon in terms
of user expectation rather than the characteristics of the video themselves.
In [64], Song et al. analyse the relationship between video content and perceived
quality, suggesting that different segments of long video sequences should be encoded
with different parameters to maximise perceived quality. They also recommend that
studies should not just focus on the intensity of motion (e.g. high or low), but also on
the size of the moving area with respect to the whole picture. Moreover, given a fixed
spatial layer, the results of this work suggest that SNR scalability should be prioritised
with respect to temporal. On the other hand, for extremely low frame rates, spatial
scalability should have priority over temporal. Finally, the evaluation performed in [65]
compares H.264 and WSVC, showing that the preferences between a degradation in the
spatial resolution and the frame size depended on the content of the test sequences and
that the behaviour of the two codecs is overall consistent, despite the fact that the type
of distortion introduced by the two encoding techniques is quite different.
In our study, we will focus on SNR scalability, as our proposed P2P systems will
mostly scale video sequences with respect to this parameter. Finally, despite the study
in [65] also focussing on WSVC, it is based on stimulus comparison and does not consider
scenarios with variable quality.
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3.2 Subjective Evaluation Methodology
In this section we clarify the methodology we used for our subjective evaluation of
scalable video over P2P. First, we give a short description of the test video sequences.
Second, we describe the characteristics of our controlled environment. Finally, we de-
scribe the scenarios we defined to simulate different behaviours of the P2P network when
transmitting scalable video sequences.
3.2.1 Test Sequences
For our subjective video quality evaluation, we used five uncompressed, high quality, test
sequences showing different types of content. All of them are real scenes and there are
no computer generated scenes nor animations. All used test sequences are professionally
acquired and show no distortion. The original content is High Definition (HD), in YUV
4:2:0 format, not interlaced and it does not include any audio. The sequences have
been downsampled to 4CIF (704x576 pixels) resolution while keeping the same aspect
ratio, to avoid introducing distortion. A 10-second interval from each sequence has been
encoded in both H.264/SVC and WSVC format using 4 layers and the encoded videos
are the same as the ones used in Saracen project [48]. Their layers roughly have the
same bit-rates; despite their differences being negligible, these values are not exactly the
same, as they are the result of the choice of other quantisation parameters. The bit-rate
of the layers depends on the sequence itself, as different activity results in a different
quality when the bit-rate is fixed and the bit-rates had to be chosen in such a way that
there was significant visual difference between the layers. All sequences have a frame
rate of 30 fps and the GOP size is 16, hence there are 16 GOPs in each video. The
content of the sequences can be summarised as follows, while a frame for each sequence
is shown in Table 3.3:
• InToTree: Camera pan, shows a building and a tree.
• PersonsReporting: Still camera, shows two persons reporting news as if they
were anchormen.
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Slow Motion
a) InToTree b) PersonsReporting
Medium-intensity Motion
c) PrimeTelFootball
Fast Motion
d) Soccer e) JohnnyTrailer
Table 3.3: Sample frames from the test sequences used for subjective evaluation.
Subjective Video Quality Evaluation of SVC over P2P 43
Sequence Name Spatial Activity (SA) Temporal Activity (TA)
InToTree 8.59 12.64
JohnnyTrailer 10.00 81.49
PersonsReporting 12.00 4.00
PrimeTelFootball 17.41 47.28
Soccer 10.20 51.28
Table 3.4: SA and TA of test sequences used for subjective evaluation.
• PrimeTelFootball: Camera pan, shows the public inside a football stadium and
the field.
• Soccer: Camera pan, shows a few people playing football. This sequence is a
standard video testing sequence and has also been used for other experiments in
this thesis.
• JohnnyTrailer: A ten-second extract from “Johnny English” movie trailer, with
fast action, sudden changes of the scene and text.
These sequences can be characterised by their spatial activity (SA) and temporal
activity (TA), which depend on the amount of details and motion they contain respect-
ively. These values have been computed as indicated in Eq. (3.2) and Eq. (3.3) [59]:
SA(n) = rmsspace[Sobel(I(n))], (3.2)
TA(n) = rmsspace[I(n)− I(n− 1)], (3.3)
where rmsspace indicates the root mean square computed over the entire frame, I(n)
indicates the frame at time n and Sobel() indicates Sobel filter [66], which is used for
edge detection and reveals the presence and location of high-frequency components in
the frame. An average for TA and SA has been computed over the selected ten seconds
for each sequence and is reported in Table 3.4. The table shows that for these tests we
have used two sequences with high TA (Soccer and JohnnyTrailer), two with low TA
(InToTree and PersonsReporting) and one with high SA and low TA (PrimeTelFootball).
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of the testing environment.
3.2.2 Testing Environment
The aim of using a controlled environment, such as a test room, is to assure the repro-
ducibility of the subjective test activity by avoiding the involuntary influence of any ex-
ternal factors and following the instructions in the guidelines [58,59] serves this purpose.
These tests were performed at the Multimedia and Vision Group (MMV) laboratory at
Queen Mary University of London and the testing environment was set up according to
the recommendations specified in [58,59]. The test room was equipped with two Desktop
PCs, each one with a LCD monitor. The ambient lighting consisted of neon lamps with
6500 K colour temperature and halogen lamps. The wall colour was black. One subject
at a time sat in front of one of the LCD screens at a distance of about two to three times
the diagonal size of the stimulus, and it was chosen specifically for this application. It
is within the range of 1 to 8 times the height of the picture height, as expressed by the
standard [59]. A picture of the test room is shown in Figure 3.1.
3.2.3 Subjective Testing
The method consisted of pair-wise comparisons between two stimuli (test sequences).
The subject was asked to indicate the perceived quality for each, on a continuous scale
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Figure 3.2: Subjective Quality Continuous Scale
from “Bad” to “Excellent”, as shown in Figure 3.2 and the ranking was expressed on
a scale from 0 to 100. The subjective test proceeded as follows. Fifteen pairs of test
sequences for each scenario were played one after another. The videos in the pair were
chosen randomly, however, one of the sequences was always the original uncompressed
bit-stream, while the other could be a H.264/SVC video, a WSVC video or another
display of the original sequence.
To limit the duration of a test session, the stimuli presentation was divided into two
separate sessions, each of which consisted of three scenarios. Prior to the test sessions, a
training session took place, where the test methodology was described to the subject by
using a set of training stimuli different from the test stimuli. Eighteen subjects (11 men
and 7 women) participated in the experiment, above the suggested value of 15 [59]. They
were recruited among a group of postgraduate students and three of them were experts
in video coding. They reported normal or corrected to normal vision. The average age
of the subjects was 26.
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Figure 3.3: SVC over P2P scenarios for subjective video evaluation.
3.2.4 Scenarios for Subjective Evaluation of P2P Transmission
For subjective evaluation, six different scenarios were considered. They were designed
to simulate actual potential behaviours of the P2P network and they can be illustrated
as follows:
Scenario 1 Only the base layer of each GOP has been decoded.
Scenario 2 The base layer and one enhancement layer have been considered.
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Scenario 3 The decoded sequence consists of the base layer and two enhancement layers.
Scenario 4 Only the base layer is considered for the first four GOPs and the number of
additional layers increases to three.
Scenario 5 Symmetrically, the first four GOPs consist of base and three enhancement
layers, after which the number of enhancement layers received gradually goes down
to zero.
Scenario 6 The first twelve GOPs of each sequence are the same as Scenario 4, while
the last four only contain the base layer.
Moreover, Figure 3.3 shows the different scenarios with respect to the number of quality
layers for each GOP on a scale from 0 to 3, where “0” indicates that only the base layer
of that GOP has been received and “3” denotes three enhancement layers.
Scenarios 1 to 3 might prove valid over a period of time when the network is relatively
stable. In P2P networks at each time the sum of all the download rates of all the nodes
in the network needs to be equal to the sum of all their upload rates, as it will be
explained in Section 5.4.2. Therefore, regardless of any consideration about fairness and
cooperation in such networks, different download rates may be experienced depending
on different capabilities of each user. If the network resources are scarce, users might
be able to download only the base layer of the test sequence, like in Scenario 1. On the
contrary, if nodes with higher capability are present, or if additional servers are used
as data seeders, users might experience higher download rates, leading to Scenario 2
or 3. Another possible case is represented by different costs associated to download.
For example, if a peer wants to join the P2P network using a mobile device over a 3G
connection, it might be only interested in the base layer of the sequence, as it might
have to pay in relation to the amount of downloaded data. The same user might want
to download a higher resolution version (base and one or two enhancement layers) when
connected over WiFi. On the other hand, Scenarios 4 to 6 correspond to nodes with
higher capability joining and recovering (Scenario 4) or leaving (Scenario 5) the network,
or a combination of these two cases (Scenario 6). In addition, Scenario 5 might also
happen as a consequence of node failures, or as a consequence of sub-optimal network
resources allocation, e.g. if a user is not using all of its uploading bandwidth, but has
no additional data it can contribute to its neighbours.
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These scenarios do not take pauses in the video playback into account and only
consider 10-second sequences. Assessing the impact of playback interruptions – especially
in comparison with very low bit-rate video – on subjective quality and performing tests
on longer sequences will be addressed as future work.
3.3 Results
In this section we present the results from both our objective and subjective evaluations.
First, we explain the metrics used for the objective evaluation and show the correspond-
ing obtained graphs. Second, we present and analyse the subjective results, obtained in
the aforementioned P2P scenarios.
3.3.1 Objective Results
The metrics we used for our objective evaluation are MSE and PSNR, already introduced
in Section 3.1. These tools are widely used by the video processing community to
evaluate the performance of lossy video codecs. One of the reason for their success is their
simplicity and ease of implementation, where at the same time they are objective metrics
used to quantify the distortion introduced in the encoding process. PSNR is a function
of the ratio between the maximum value a signal can have and the “noise” associated
to compression, which is represented in this case by the MSE. It is usually expressed in
decibels and is calculated on the luminance component of the video. Therefore, a higher
PSNR is better, as it implies a lower error. For a single frame, MSE and PSNR are
calculated as shown in Eq. (3.4) and Eq. (3.5):
MSE =
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
[
f(i, j)− f˜(i, j)
]2
M ·N , (3.4)
PSNR = 20 · log10
(
255√
MSE
)
, (3.5)
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Table 3.5: PSNR for slow and medium-intensity motion sequences; 4-layer WSVC and
H.264/SVC.
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Table 3.6: PSNR for fast motion sequences; 4-layer WSVC and H.264/SVC.
where M ·N represents the total number of pixels in the frame, f(i, j) represents a pixel
from the original image, f˜(i, j) is the reconstructed image and 255 is the maximum
(peak) luminance value, provided that it is represented using 8 bits. The sequences have
been encoded with the aforementioned codecs, H.264/SVC and WSVC, using bit-rates
that were as close as possible to guarantee a fair comparison, and have been adapted to
all four possible extraction points, e.g. removing part of the original encoded bit-stream.
Table 3.5 and 3.6 show the PSNR of the test sequences at these extraction points. An
important remark is that sequences with low TA and SA achieve good performances at
low bit-rates, as there is strong correlation between frames and less energy associated to
high frequency coefficients in the spatial domain, whereas sequences with fast motion or
high detail require a much higher bit-rate to achieve the same performance.
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The results show that for slow moving sequences (with low TA) WSVC performs
better than H.264/SVC, whereas for high moving sequences (high TA) the roles are
inverted, especially at low bit-rates. Moreover, at higher bit-rates, with the exception
of Soccer (in Table 3.6), WSVC shows either comparable or better performance with
respect to H.264/SVC for all types of sequences (low, medium and high TA).
3.3.2 Subjective Results
Table 3.7 and 3.8 show the average MOS for Scenarios 1 to 6 for the five test sequences,
which have been grouped according to their motion content.
First of all, we will consider Scenario 1 to 3, where bit-rates do not change throughout
the playback. As expected, the average perceived quality increases as the bit-rate and
PSNR increase. This difference is statistically significant in most cases, and the biggest
difference can be found in fast moving sequences. For the cases in which this difference
is not statistically relevant, it is plausible that the difference in the encoding bit-rate is
too little to have a significant impact on the video quality perceived by the subjects.
As far as slow moving sequences are concerned (PersonsReporting and InToTree),
Table 3.7 indicates that WSVC performs as good as H.264/SVC when only the base layer
has been decoded and better than the other codec when two enhancement layers have
been received. In the case when only one enhancement layer has been received, InToTree
has a higher MOS when encoded in WSVC format, while the performance is similar for
PersonsReporting. On the other hand, for fast moving sequences (JohnnyTrailer and
Soccer), H.264/SVC outperforms WSVC at all bit-rates, as shown in Table 3.8. The
graphs suggest that for H.264/SVC receiving two enhancement layers, given the current
bit-rate parameters, does not have a much bigger impact than receiving only one, as
it does not result in a much bigger gain as compared to only receiving the base layer.
For WSVC, on the other hand, the increase in the perceived video quality is much more
constant. Finally, for the medium-moving sequence (PrimeTelFootball), the graph in
Table 3.7 indicates that the perceived quality does not show a significant difference
depending on the codec used – even if the average MOS is bigger for WSVC at the
highest bit-rate – and therefore we can say that for this video the performance of WSVC
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Table 3.7: Mean Opinion Score for slow and medium-intensity motion sequences, all scen-
arios, WSVC and H.264/SVC.
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Table 3.8: Mean Opinion Score for fast moving sequences, all scenarios, WSVC and
H.264/SVC.
and H.264/SVC is similar. An important remark is that these results are coherent,
as expected, with our objective evaluation, with the exception of JohnnyTrailer. Our
explanation for this behaviour is the different types of artefacts introduced by the two
codecs; for example, the users might be more accustomed to the type of compression
introduced by the standard codec. Two frames showing the impact of the two different
encoding techniques are shown in Figure 3.4.
Scenarios 4 to 6 correspond to more dynamic situations that may occur during scal-
able video transmission over P2P. The average MOS for these scenarios are also shown
in Table 3.7 and Table 3.8. Overall, the scores obtained by the two codecs in Scenarios 4
and 6 are much lower than those found in Scenario 2, despite the average bit-rate being
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(a) WSVC (b) H.264/SVC
Figure 3.4: Sample frames from InToTree; only the base layer has been decoded.
higher, while Scenario 5 is roughly comparable with Scenario 2 (despite the uncertainty
on the results being bigger). Therefore, these results suggest that the subjects did not
like changes in the video quality, however were positively impressed by a high video qual-
ity at the beginning of the playback, which could be achieved for example by extending
the pre-buffering time. This result may however be a limitation of the sequences used for
testing, as they are 10-seconds long. Previous literature studies show that sudden quality
degradation can significantly affect the perceived video quality [61], and a recent solu-
tion proposed in the context of Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over HTTP (DASH) [67]
aims at using intermediate quality layers to smoothen the transition from high to low
quality, which results in an overall improvement of the performance. Scenario 5 in our
study also presents a smooth transition and in our opinion this is the reason why the
MOS is higher than expected.
An important remark is that the behaviour observed in these scenarios is the same
for both codecs, which suggests that both WSVC and H.264/SVC are affected by PSNR
variations in roughly the same way. Finally, even for the variable scenarios the res-
ults suggest that H.264/SVC performs better than WSVC for fast moving sequences,
while for slow and medium moving sequences the performances of the two codecs are
comparable in most cases.
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3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we analysed scalable video transmission over P2P from a subjective video
quality perspective. Before conducting the subjective experiments, we performed an
objective analysis using the most advanced PSNR metric. According to this evaluation,
WSVC shows better results for slow moving sequences, while H.264/SVC performs better
for fast moving sequences, in particular at low bit-rates. On the other hand, at higher
bit-rates WSVC shows equal or better results with respect to H.264/SVC for both slow
and fast moving sequences, the only exception being Soccer.
As far as our subjective evaluation is concerned, we found that in general, for slow
moving sequences, there was either no significant difference (for low bit-rates) or WSVC
performed better (at higher bit-rates) as compared to H.264/SVC. This is coherent
with what we already found in our objective evaluation. For fast moving sequences,
H.264/SVC performed better as compared to WSVC, especially at low bit-rates. For
medium moving sequences, there was no significant difference between the two codecs.
Regarding the scenarios with constant received bit-rates, we observed that in general,
as expected, the performance of both codecs improved as users had successfully down-
loaded more layers at the receiving end, through the P2P network. Hence, the protocol
designer needs to make sure that all the users of the system receive the highest pos-
sible layer according to the given network conditions. On the other hand, this situation
radically changes when the number of decoded layers is not constant. In fact, Scenario
2 received higher perceived quality score as compared to Scenarios 4 and 6, while the
scores assigned to the videos in this Scenario were comparable with Scenario 5. This
result confirms that frequent quality changes are not seen favourably by the users, and
lower yet constant received video bit-rate will result in a better user experience. How-
ever, quality will be overall higher if the user receives the better quality at the beginning
of sequence.
3.4.1 A Lesson Learned
Finally, as far as the findings in this chapter that will be used in the remaining parts of
this thesis are concerned, they can be summarised as follows:
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• The results obtained with WSVC codec have the same validity as those that would
be obtained with H.264/SVC.
• It might be useful to increase the pre-buffering time to provide users with a better
video quality since the beginning instead of changing the video quality, as users
seem to be biased by a first-impression factor.
• The aim of chunk request policies for both H.264/SVC and WSVC should be to
provide final users with a received video quality that is as constant as possible.
In the next chapter, we will describe a general block diagram which is valid for all our
proposed architectures, then we will illustrate our proposed algorithms for piece picking
and neighbour selection for P2P SVC transmission, which will consider the results found
in this chapter.
Chapter 4
Scalable Video Adaptation to P2P
Transmission
This chapter starts with the presentation of a block diagram showing a general architec-
ture for SVC streaming over a P2P network. Subsequently, our first proposed approach
is described. In summary, it consists of a piece picking and a neighbour selection policy,
whose aim is to allow efficient scalable video transmission over a P2P network. In such a
system, users experience different video qualities depending on their available resources.
These techniques have been implemented as modifications of existing algorithms for
non-scalable video. This is a basic solution, which handles scalable video streaming
over P2P networks in such a way that the system is still compatible with the original
Tribler [68] BitTorrent client, presented in Section 4.3.3. Therefore, resource allocation
to other peers is performed according to the algorithm used by the original client, which
will also be illustrated in Section 4.3.3. This chapter is organised as follows: the general
social P2P architecture for SVC is presented in Section 4.1; the problem is introduced
in Section 4.2; the related background is provided in Section 4.3; our algorithms are
described in Section 4.4; Section 4.5 gives a short description of how the framework for
testing these techniques has been implemented; Section 4.6 consists of the experimental
evaluation; finally, Section 4.7 concludes this chapter, analysing the pros and cons of
this solution.
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4.1 Overview of a General Social P2P SVC System
Before explaining our proposed architectures, we describe a general block scheme for a
system that performs transmission of scalable videos over a P2P network that presents
social features. It will be used as a reference for the techniques illustrated in this chapter
and in the following ones. First, we illustrate a diagram that shows the main components,
and then we provide a short description for each of them.
4.1.1 Block Diagram
The scheme presented in this section is valid for each of the approaches described in this
thesis, however, depending on the approach itself, some blocks might not be used, or
might correspond to state-of-the-art technologies instead of new contributions. For the
systems presented in this chapter, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 we draw similar diagrams,
highlighting where the novelties lie. The architecture is shown in Figure 4.1. In this
and all the related diagrams, full lines indicate the exchange of video chunks, while the
dashed ones denote control or information messages.
As P2P networking relies on the fact that users both receive and transmit data,
we can identify the two most important blocks: one which is responsible for resource
allocation (uploading) and one for chunk selection (downloading). This is not valid for
all P2P systems (only for the pull-based ones), however, all our proposed techniques
rely on this scheme. In general, downloading mechanisms need to be aware of the
characteristics of the video sequence they are requesting. In other words, they need to
know the structure of the codec. On the other hand, resource allocation can depend on
a credit-based framework, and information received from reliable peers, such as friends
in a social network. More specifically, these blocks can have the following functions:
• Chunk Selection. In this thesis, we will usually refer to this block as “piece
picking policy”. It is responsible for requesting chunks of data to other users. As
our systems deal with video transmission, it needs to request these chunks with
the aim of ensuring a satisfactory video experience for the final user. For example,
it needs to make sure that video chunks are correctly received and decoded before
their playback time, with the best quality a user can afford to download. Our
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Figure 4.1: Generic block diagram for our proposed architectures.
piece picking policies work with scalable video. This allows to add flexibility to
the system. In fact, some parts of a scalable video bit-stream can be removed and
the new sequence still be decoded, albeit a downgraded version. This system needs
information from:
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– Chunk Buffer. This module keeps track of the missing video parts. The
Chunk Selection module will then generate requests depending on the inform-
ation provided by this module (and the respective timestamps of the chunks).
• Resource Allocation. This is the most critical part in every P2P system. It is
responsible for deciding which users a peer should cooperate with and the amount
of this contribution. Optimising resource allocation (with the constraint of the
upload capacities of the single peers) also means making more data available to
the network. This can result in a “virtuous circle”, as this data can be shared
with even more users. In our proposed resource allocation modules, this decision
always depends on a peer’s current credit or information users can retrieve from
their circle of trusted users. Credit-based P2P paradigms are often introduced to
promote fairness among peers. We remark that if a system does not make use of
rewards or punishments for good or deceptive behaviour, a peer has no interest
in sharing their resources. This was a typical situation in the first P2P systems,
whereas in the most recent ones, resource allocation mechanisms tend to reward
users that have proven to be trustworthy. This module requires the information
provided by:
– User Behaviour Monitor. This module is responsible for collecting inform-
ation about the interactions a peer has had with the rest of the network, and
more generically about the network itself. This module is also responsible
for the generation of some metrics, which will be evaluated by the Resource
Allocation module when taking decisions.
– Social Networking. The increase of popularity of social networks has contrib-
uted to the de-anonymisation of the Internet, as users are allowed to connect
with other people they might know in real life. When a relationship among
users that trust each other, such as “friendship”, is established, they can share
some information which is de facto verified. Within the context of P2P net-
works, each user tries to build a map of their neighbours, trying to understand
whether they are cooperative or malicious. When friend users trust each other,
they can combine their efforts and have a better understanding of the bigger
picture. It is important, however, that peers choose their friends carefully, oth-
erwise the system might be vulnerable to social attacks, where malicious peers
ask for a someone else’s trust, sometimes even pretending to be multiple users.
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4.2 Problem Description
As far as our first approach is concerned, we propose a simple solution to allow trans-
mission of scalable sequences over a P2P network. The starting point is the existing
BitTorrent protocol, which is however not suitable for video streaming without proper
modifications, as it will be discussed later in Section 4.3. The scalable sequences we
use are encoded in WSVC [32] format, but this solution can be easily extended to
H.264/SVC [5]. Despite this codec supporting spatial, temporal, SNR and combined
scalability, as explained in Chapter 2, we will only consider quality scalability in this
case.
More specifically, the issues we address in this chapter are the following:
• Define a piece picking policy whose aim is to download the video chunks that
are following the current playback position, trying to maximise the received video
quality given the current available resources.
• Propose a neighbour selection policy which identifies unreliable peers in the network,
in order to avoid downloading base layer chunks from them.
4.3 Related Work
Given the description of the original BitTorrent protocol in Section 2.2.2, it is clear that
it is not possible to transmit video sequences efficiently without introducing some modi-
fications. For example, rarest-first piece picking policy is incompatible with sequential
frame visualisation; in fact, a user has to wait for the download to be complete before
being able to play the video. Moreover, T4T mechanism alone can result in poor transfer
rates at the beginning of the download, which means that pre-buffering phase could be
unnecessarily long.
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4.3.1 Popular P2P Systems for Video Transmission
First of all, we describe a few very popular P2P systems that can perform either VoD
or live streaming. None of them were originally designed for SVC transmission, however
all these protocols can in principle be extended to support it.
Similarly to our proposed approach, PPLive [69] is an example of pull-based architec-
ture for VoD, where users need to implement a piece selection and neighbour selection
policy. As far as the chunk selection strategy is concerned, it is mixed, in the sense that
sequential download has the highest priority, but rarest-first is also applied. Pieces are
requested from a set of neighbours whose size is kept under control and peers have no
control over their level of contribution, which implies that cooperation is enforced. In
addition to SVC support, this is the main difference with our approaches described both
in this and in the following chapters.
BulletMedia [70] is another solution where peers need to explicitly request data to
other users. Video blocks are selected according to a rarest random strategy, however
the base principle of this protocol is that there should be a minimum number of content
replicas available at all times. Therefore, a peer not only requests blocks that are close
to its playback position, but also other parts of the stream that are not currently being
cached by a sufficient number of peers in the network. This is known as proactive caching
and is only performed if the current playback can be sustained. Proactive caching could
in principle be applied to our system as well, provided that there are enough spare
resources available, however in our case peers will in general try to improve their received
video quality, rather than downloading other parts of the stream.
On the other hand, RedCarpet [71] divides a video sequence in segments, which are
subsequently divided into blocks. As far as chunk requests are concerned, peers use
different policies when requesting data from a central server, which owns the first copy,
and the other clients. As far as server policies are concerned, in addition to requesting
a random piece in the segment, options include requesting: the overall rarest piece in
the system, the system-wide rarest piece in the segment, the rarest piece in a peer’s
neighbourhood and the rarest piece in a peer’s neighbourhood belonging to the peer’s
current segment. Client policies, on the other side, allow to request a random piece
within a segment or the rarest piece in a peer’s neighbourhood within the current seg-
ment. An important remark is that all the peers follow the same policy. The authors
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propose many other policies, which also use network coding, however their main finding
is that the system performs better if peers receive the globally rarest blocks, and not
just the ones within the segment. As far as a comparison with our systems is concerned,
we considered using a sliding window as opposed to dividing video chunks into groups
a more appropriate choice, as the window keeps following the current playback posi-
tion. Moreover, the experimental evaluation of this system shows huge variations in its
performance over time, with minima when a peer switches from a segment to the next
one.
Finally, SplitStream [72], as the name suggests, splits a live stream into several flows
or strips which are transmitted over different trees. As the burden of transmission over
a tree lies on the intermediate nodes and the authors aim at creating a fair system,
each peer needs to be an intermediate node in at most one tree and a leaf node in
the others. In this case, this set of trees is said to be interior-node disjoint. Multiple
Description Coding (MDC) [73] – a technique based on SVC in which the more separate
and individually decodable sub-streams or descriptions of a video are received, the better
its final quality will be – can be used in this system, however, as far as the negative
points of this solution are concerned, tree-based architectures are usually more expensive
to maintain with respect to mesh.
4.3.2 Multimedia Streaming Using BitTorrent and BiToS
The solution proposed by [74] for multimedia streaming using BitTorrent introduces
a new selection policy for both chunks and neighbours. Regarding chunks, a sliding
window like the one shown in Figure 4.2 is used to separate w pieces that follow the
current playback position from the rest of the stream. In this case, w is the length of the
window, which is strictly correlated to playback delay. Pieces that do not belong to this
window are not downloaded. Pieces that follow the last chunk in the window might be
downloaded in the future, but are not considered interesting at present, as their playback
position is still too far away. Missing pieces that precede the playback position are not
of any use anymore and therefore they will be ignored. Inside the window, chunks are
downloaded according to a rarest-first policy. In fact, they might be more appealing
to peers that download the video both in a sequential-like way and in the standard
BitTorrent fashion. As far as neighbour selection is concerned, modifications are made
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Figure 4.2: Sliding window notion using the rarest-first policy for BitTorrent.
to achieve a better performance during the start-up phase. A randomised version of
T4T policy, which “gives more free tries to a larger number of peers in the swarm”, is
used to give an advantage to those peers that have got nothing or little that they can
share.
Another solution, BitTorrent Streaming (BiToS) [75], uses a “High Priority Set”,
which is similar to a sliding window and pieces are picked from this or from the “Re-
maining Pieces Set” with probabilities of p and 1 − p respectively. The optimal choice
of p indicates that there exists a trade-off between requesting pieces that are urgently
needed for playback and rare pieces that are appealing to other peers. This is one of the
key problems in BitTorrent multimedia applications.
Both of these techniques were considered innovative at the time they were proposed
(2006-2007). In fact, they are an attempt to use BitTorrent in applications it was not
originally intended for. However, they also show some limitations. For example, they
do not consider that many peers might have different playback positions and therefore
they might be mainly interested in small and different subsets of the original sequence,
which is an issue that will be tackled by the approach presented in the next section.
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4.3.3 Tribler BitTorrent Client
Tribler [68] is a BitTorrent client that was developed at Delft University of Technology,
in the Netherlands. It is based on ABC [Yet Another BitTorrent Client] [76], which is
itself based on BitTornado [77]. New features include exploitation of social relationships
among peers, which will be described in Chapter 6, and content discovery through
exploration of the network instead of browsing a torrent repository.
Give-to-Get Algorithm
The typical course of action of a peer in this system is the following: when it starts
downloading a video, playback is delayed until the end of the pre-buffering period. This
happens when the estimated downloading time required to complete the sequence is
shorter than its playback time. After this, playback starts. When it finishes playing, the
peer leaves the swarm; if the download has finished before the end of the playback, that
peer will act as a seeder for a certain amount of time. Within this interval of time, the
behaviour of the peer can be described by the give-to-get (G2G) algorithm [9], which
consists of three parts: an unchoking algorithm, which is the module responsible for
resource allocation, a piece picking and a neighbour selection algorithm. An important
observation is that here seeking and fast-forward are not taken into account, and are
not even supported by G2G, even though in the future the protocol might be extended.
Unchoking Algorithm The video stream is divided into smaller pieces, as it happens
with any other file. Since G2G does not know anything about codecs, different GOPs
might belong to the same piece and vice-versa. Each peer shares information about the
pieces it has with its neighbours, which might send requests for them. These neighbours
can be unchoked according to their performance evaluation or optimistically unchoked.
Typically, at least 3 and at most 3+n neighbours, where n could be for example equal to
2, are unchoked according to their rank until 90% of the upload bandwidth is saturated,
while at most one peer is optimistically unchoked. It is obvious that if the number of
requests is less or equal to n+ 4, all the peers will be unchoked. A pseudo-code version
of the proposed method is given in Algorithm 4.3.1. Peers are ranked according to the
number of pieces they have forwarded in the last δ seconds, hence the “give-to-get”
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name, and at the end of this period the best peers are unchoked; optimistic unchoking,
instead, is performed every 2δ seconds.




Algorithm 4.3.1: GiveToGet(N∗)
choke all neighbours N∗
N ← all interested neighbours
sort N on forwarding rank
for i← 1 to min(|N |, 3 + n)
do

unchoke (N [i])
b←∑ik=1(our upload speed to N [k])
if i ≥ 3 and b > UPLINK · 0.9
then break
The ranking procedure is made of two different steps: first of all “children” peers c
are sorted decreasingly by a “parent” peer p according to the number of chunks they
downloaded from it that have been forwarded to other “grandchildren” peers g. Second,
ties are broken according to the total number of pieces the children have forwarded
to their grandchildren. Both steps are required to create a fair mechanism. In fact,
assuming that only the pieces received from p and uploaded to g are considered, it will
be extremely difficult for a peer c that has been optimistically unchoked to become a
good uploader of those chunks over a short period of time. Therefore, also considering
the total number of forwarded chunks helps in identifying well-behaving peers. On the
other hand, if only the total number of forwarded pieces is considered, a few peers with
high capacity will be unchoked by a large number of neighbours and the others will be
left to starve.
Another issue is evaluating the number of pieces that have been forwarded, since it is
obvious that a parent cannot trust its children c. Therefore, a parent peer p will not ask
them for information about the pieces they have uploaded, but for a list of their children
g, which will be contacted in order to have a feedback, as it is shown in Figure 4.3.
This way, a peer has no interest in lying about its children and has an incentive to share
as much as it can. Free-riders can still download from other peers, since they can be
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optimistically unchoked, but if there is no more spare capacity in the system, they will
be automatically cut out.
Piece Picking It was already pointed out that in VoD applications for P2P the order
which the pieces are downloaded in is crucial, as well as delivering these pieces in time.
Therefore, each piece is given a deadline, which is infinite if the video is not being played.
A peer is interested in requesting a chunk if three conditions hold: another neighbour
has got that chunk, that peer does not have the chunk and has not requested it in the
past, and finally there is a chance that it arrives before its deadline.
As far as the piece picking policy is concerned, two important issues have to be taken
into account: chunks should be delivered to the video player in order, and therefore
should be also downloaded in a sequential fashion, and it is necessary to own pieces that
other peers want, in order to get good upload rates. The solution proposed in G2G
algorithm gives different priorities to different chunks. Let us suppose that m is the
playback position of peer p, where m can be piece 0, if the playback has not started; p
will choose the first interesting chunk i in the following three sets:
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• High priority: m ≤ i < m + h. If playback has already started, the piece with
the smaller index will be downloaded, otherwise the policy will be rarest-first.
• Mid priority: m+ h ≤ i < m+ (µ+ 1)h. Chunk i will be picked on a rarest-first
basis.
• Low priority: m+ (µ+ 1)h ≤ i. Chunk i will be picked on a rarest-first basis.
Since mid and low priority are separated, pieces with low priority will be picked only if
there are no medium priority chunks left; this distinction is made because mid priority
chunks could be part of the high priority set in the near future. If two pieces are equally
rare, one of them will be chosen at random. These three sets are shown in Figure 4.4.
Finally, every time a new piece is requested, the system estimates the arrival time of
all the requested chunks. If this is greater than the deadline, the corresponding request
will be dropped. Periodically, the playing buffer is filled with the received pieces and
the playback position, which determines the starting point of the different priority sets,
is incremented.
Neighbour Selection Tribler also implements a neighbour selection policy. Its aim is
to discriminate between “good” or “reliable” peers and “bad” ones. While downloading
a video, a peer might fail to deliver a piece belonging to the high priority set before it
is required for playing, forcing the system to pause. Therefore, a “black list” of all the
peers that have failed to deliver on time is kept (for each download). If the number
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of failures exceeds a certain threshold, no pieces from the high or mid priority set will
be requested from that peer anymore and they will be picked from the low-priority set
instead. This threshold is 4 for live streaming, while it is 0 for VoD.
4.3.4 P2P Scalable Streaming Using a Sliding Window
A few techniques for scalable video transmission over a P2P network have already been
proposed. The framework described in [78] can be classified as a “mesh-pull live video
streaming system with a T4T strategy”. The structure of the overlay network in this
case is similar to the original BitTorrent. Advantages of this approach include simple
design and robustness to sudden changes in the network, typical of these systems [79].
An important remark is that, while tree-push systems have been extensively studied in
Academia, most of practical implementations (like CoolStreaming [80] or the already-
cited PPLive [69]) rely on a mesh-pull architecture.
In the considered system [78], a source encodes a video that consists of L layers
and each of them is divided into Layer Chunks (LCs). These LCs correspond to ∆
seconds of the original sequence. They might have different sizes, depending on the layer
they belong to. If a peer wants to watch a video, it requests a list of peers currently
downloading it to some entity (whose role is similar to the BitTorrent tracker) and
establishes a connection with several of them. In this system, peers exchange information
about the chunks they own with their neighbours.
As far as the resource allocation module is concerned, the main idea is that a peer
should provide a larger portion of its upload capacity to those peers with the highest
download rates. Several receivers might be sending requests to a supplier at the same
time, while the supplier only serves one request at a time. The probability pn,k of supplier
n serving a request from a receiver k is given in Eq. (4.1):
pn,k =
In,kd
γ
n,k∑
i∈Kn
In,id
γ
n,i
, (4.1)
where Kn is the set of neighbours of n and dn,k is the current transfer rate from peer k to
n. In,k is defined as 0 if no requests from peer k are in the queue and 1 otherwise. The
denominator in Eq. (4.1) thus represents the total transfer rate to peer n from the peers
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Figure 4.5: Buffer state at a given time.
that have pending requests. Finally, γ is a correction factor. Therefore, pn,k can also be
seen as a local reputation, since the peer that uploads the largest amount of data to a
supplier has the highest probability of being served. On the other hand, it is clear that
free-riding is only tolerated if there is enough spare capacity in the system, for example
if there are no other pending requests.
On the receiver side, the scheduler uses a sliding window, which is formed by a fixed
number of LCs and video layers. Chunks request is divided into several rounds. At
the beginning of each round, the system state is characterised by a buffer, as shown in
Figure 4.5. In order to decide which LCs should be downloaded, each of them is assigned
a score. This value depends on layer index, playback deadline and rarity. For a generic
peer n, the score function for a LC can be expressed as:
Snl,t = G(l, t, λ), (4.2)
where λ represents the number of neighbours of n that currently own a specific piece
and l and t are the layer index ad the time index of LC respectively. More specifically,
this function can be defined as a linear combination of these three characteristics of a
LC:
Snl,t = w1
l
L
+ w2
t− t0
B
+ w3
λ
H
, (4.3)
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where t0 is the current playback position, B is the window length, k is the number
of neighbours of n, w1, w2 and w3 are weight factors and L has already been defined
as the total number of layers. LCs with the highest scores are requested first. These
are LCs belonging to low quality layers, with a time index that is close to t0 and are
owned by a limited number of neighbours. An important remark is that only pieces
which are believed to be received on time are requested. This estimation is based on the
performance of a peer’s neighbours. Finally, in order to completely exploit upload and
download capacities of peers, low-priority requests are defined.
The idea of using a sliding window has been extensively applied in P2P video stream-
ing, and this solution is no exception. However, in this architecture no extra importance
is given to the base layer of the sequence, as the weight factors w1, w2 and w3 are fixed.
4.4 Proposed Approach
The block diagram of our proposed solution is shown in Figure 4.6. It highlights that our
contributions described here lie in the chunk selection mechanism, and more specifically
in the piece picking and neighbour selection policies. Our piece picking policy formulates
how the scalable layers [32] of WSVC video are prioritised. It associates different gains,
which result in different priorities, to different parts of the bit-stream, in order to allow
video playback while the sequence is being downloaded. In practice, this policy selects
the subset of the video bit-stream with the highest bit-rate that can be currently afforded
by a user. Moreover, the desired behaviour of the system is that playback should never
pause. Pauses occur when a user fails to receive the base layer of a GOP before it is
needed for decoding. This may happen even if the overall download bandwidth is high,
if these chunks are requested from slow peers. Therefore, our neighbour selection policy
is applied. It does not allow a user to request this part of the bit-stream from peers
that might fail to deliver it in time. As the diagram also shows, our technique uses the
original G2G unchoking algorithm [9] and social-based aspects are not considered here
yet.
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Figure 4.6: Block diagram for the proposed approach.
4.4.1 Piece Picking Policy
This work has also been published in [12, 14, 15]. First of all, WSVC scalable video
bit-streams are split into GOPs and atoms as explained in Section 2.3.3. However, only
quality scalability is considered here, in order to limit the complexity of our approach.
Therefore, groups of atoms will form quality layers. An important remark is that atoms
can be grouped in different ways in order to create spatial or temporal layers and deciding
to exploit another type of scalability does not affect the proposed algorithm. As it will
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be shown in the experimental evaluation in Section 4.6, it is also possible to exploit
combined scalability by choosing the right encoding parameters.
On the other hand, according to BitTorrent protocol files are split into chunks or
pieces [1]. Since there is no correlation between these two divisions, some information
is required to map GOPs and layers into pieces and vice versa. This information can
be stored inside an index file, which should be transmitted together with the video
sequence. Therefore, the first step consists of creating a new torrent that contains both
files. It is clear that the index file should have the highest priority and therefore should
be downloaded first. Once the index file is completed, it is opened and information
about offsets of different GOPs and layers is read.
For the purpose of explanation, we now assume that all BitTorrent pieces are available
from at least one peer. In other words, we assume that there are no missing pieces.
Moreover, we consider a generic playback position. At this point, it is possible to define
the following quantities and functions:
L, total number of GOPs in the sequence.
Q, total number of quality layers.
W , is a window size (in GOPs).
(t, q), represents a GOP index (t) and quality layer index (q), where (t, q) ∈
(0, ..., L)×(0, ..., Q). Each of these ordered pairs is associated to a set of BitTorrent
pieces.
tp, current playback position (GOP). Since playback has already started, tp > 0.
g(t, q), gain function. It measures the gain currently associated to BitTorrent pieces
of (t, q).
r(t, q), request function. It returns the number of BitTorrent pieces associated to
(t, q) that have never been requested.
S is the set of possible candidates ((t1, q1), . . . , (tN , qN)) which a new picked Bit-
Torrent piece belongs to.
P (S) = (p1, . . . , pk) is a function that maps a set of WSVC GOPs and layers S into
a set of BitTorrent pieces; p1, . . . , pk are sorted according to their piece id.
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This policy uses a sliding window, which consists of W GOPs. The first GOP in the
window is the one with index tp+ 1, while the last one has index tp+W . Assuming that
L tp +W , the following relations hold:
g(t, q) = 0
if (t ≤ tp, q ∈ (0, . . . , Q)) ∨ r(t, q) = 0, (4.4)
g(t, q) =
1
1 + q
if t ∈ (tp + 1, . . . , tp +W ), q ∈ (0, . . . , Q), (4.5)
g(t, q) =
1
1 +Q+ (t− (tp +W ))
if t ∈ (tp +W + 1, . . . , L), q ∈ (0, . . . , Q). (4.6)
First of all, Eq. (4.4) indicates that no pieces lying before the window will be reques-
ted, as no gain is associated to the corresponding (t, q) pair. The same holds for any
(t, q) whose pieces have already been requested. Eq. (4.5) indicates that pieces inside
the sliding window that correspond to the same quality layer also have the same gain.
Finally, Eq. (4.6) shows that pieces lying after the window have a gain that only de-
pends on the GOP they belong to. Moreover, these pieces always have a smaller gain
with respect to those inside the window. An important remark is that the gain function
in Eq. (4.5) and Eq. (4.6) has been defined in such way as it is a monotone decreasing
function and could be replaced with any other function that satisfies the same property.
Therefore, a peer requests pieces from layer i + 1 only if it has already requested
layer i completely. Similarly, a peer only requests pieces lying after the window if all
the pieces inside the window are already marked as requested. As defining priorities in
such way aims to achieve a uniform received video bit-rate among the GOPs inside the
window, this mechanism also allows to reduce fluctuations in the received video quality,
which results in smoother transitions. This offers a better subjective quality to the final
user, as indicated by the results in Chapter 3. That is, this mechanism limits the impact
of either positive or negative peaks in the download bandwidth, provided that these
variations occur over a period of time that is shorter than the duration of the sliding
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window. Finally, as a longer window results in a longer permanence of a GOP inside
it, increasing its size makes the system less vulnerable to bandwidth fluctuations, which
results in a smoother video playback. However, this comes at the expenses of a longer
delay in case of live streaming and a longer pre-buffering time in VoD.
The piece picking rule consists of two steps:
1. Finding the best set of candidates S, which is given by S = arg max(t,q) {g(t, q)}. It
is a set of (ti, qi) that corresponds to a set of BitTorrent pieces P (S) = (p1, . . . , pk).
2. Choosing a piece from this set. At this step, the decision rule is the following.
Given S = ((t1, q1), . . . , (tN , qN)):
• If q1 = · · · = qi = · · · = qN = 0, picked piece p will be the one in P (S) with
the smallest id that has not been requested yet. These are pieces that belong
to the base layer. This rule gives a higher priority to the base layer of GOPs
according to their distance from the current playback position, since the closest
ones are the most urgently required for avoiding pauses, as we will see.
• Otherwise, the rarest piece in P (S) that has not been already requested will
be picked. This is the standard BitTorrent picking policy applied to a smaller
set.
The window shifts every ∆GOP seconds, where ∆GOP represents the duration of a
GOP. The only exception is given by the first shift, which is performed after the pre-
buffering, which lasts W · ∆GOP seconds. Pre-buffering only starts when the index
file has been received. Every time the window shifts, two operations are made. First,
downloaded pieces are checked, in order to evaluate which layers have been completely
downloaded. Second, all outstanding requests regarding pieces of a GOP that lie before
the window are cancelled. An important remark is that the window only shifts if at
least the base layer has been received, otherwise the system will auto-pause. As far
as missing pieces are concerned, they are treated as chunks that have already been
requested. However, this only happens during the piece picking phase. If a missing piece
belongs to the base layer, the system is paused until it is received correctly. Otherwise,
the available chunks will be extracted and decoded.
Figure 4.7 shows the behaviour of the system with W = 3. An early stage of the
pre-buffering phase is shown in Figure 4.7a. The peer is downloading pieces from the
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Figure 4.7: Sliding window for scalable video bit-stream a) Pre-buffering phase starts, b)
Pre-buffering phase ends, c) The window shifts after GOP 0, d) The window
shifts after GOP 1.
base layer according to their piece id, while in Figure 4.7b the first two layers have
been downloaded and pieces are being picked from the enhancement layer 2 according
to a rarest-first policy. In Figure 4.7c, the window has shifted. As not all the pieces
of enhancement layer 2 of GOP 0 have been received, this layer and higher layers are
discarded. In this phase, pieces from the base layer and the enhancement layer 1 of
GOP 3 have a higher priority with respect to enhancement layer 2 of GOP 1 and 2. In
Figure 4.7d all the GOPs have the same number of complete layers and pieces are picked
from enhancement layer 3.
An alternative approach which exploits FGS of WSVC could use only two layers
(base and enhancement). The base layer could correspond to a video which has the
minimum acceptable quality according to QoE-related considerations. On the other
hand, the algorithm could dynamically set a target received video bit-rate depending on
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the current network conditions and request all the chunks belonging to this enhancement
layer according to a rarest-first policy. This would increase the chance of downloading
data that cannot be decoded – due to the hierarchical structure of WSVC bit-stream –
but also the probability that the set of chunks different peers own is more diverse, which
is one of the keys to efficient resource allocation.
An important remark is that this solution presents some analogies with [78], illus-
trated in Section 4.3.4. However, a WSVC video is used in our work. Moreover, the
correlation between LCs and BitTorrent chunks is not considered and the base layer is
not downloaded sequentially. Another difference is the neighbour selection policy, which
is illustrated in the next section.
4.4.2 Neighbour Selection Policy
It is extremely important that at least the base layer of each GOP is received before
the window shifts. Occasionally, slow pieces in the swarm might delay the receiving of
a BitTorrent piece, even if the overall download bandwidth is high. This problem is
critical if the requested piece belongs to the base layer, as it might force the playback
to pause. Therefore, these pieces should be requested from good neighbours. Good
neighbours are those peers that own the piece with the highest download rates, which
alone could provide the current peer with a transfer rate that is above a certain threshold
and this set is updated at every base layer chunk request, as it depends on the set of
peers that own that chunk. During the pre-buffering phase, any piece can be requested
from any peer. However, every time the window shifts, the current download rates of
all the neighbours are evaluated and the peers are sorted in descending order.
Let us suppose that p is a piece belonging to the base layer that a peer wants to
download and N1, . . . , Nk are the peer’s neighbours that are currently uploading to (or
unchoking [1]) it that own this piece. Since neighbours are sorted, R(N1) > · · · >
R(Ni) > · · · > R(Nk), where R(Ni) indicates the current download rate from neighbour
i and k is the number of neighbours. The threshold value is calculated as:
RT =
n0 · l(p)
W ·∆GOP , (4.7)
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Figure 4.8: Flowchart diagram of our proposed neighbour selection policy.
where n0 represents the number of pieces in the base layer that are currently inside the
window, l(p) is the size of the BitTorrent piece for this file and the other quantities have
been already defined. In other words, RT is the minimum rate that allows these pieces
from the base layer to be received in time. Assuming that
T ∗=ˆ min
T
T∑
i=1
R(Ni) > RT , T ≤ k. (4.8)
T ∗ is the minimum number of neighbours which own this piece, whose sum of download
rates exceeds the threshold and N1, . . . , NT ∗ is the set of neighbours from which base
layer pieces can be requested. A flowchart diagram explaining this algorithm is shown
in Figure 4.8.
An important remark is that, as far as BitTorrent is concerned, it has been proven
that peers with similar upload bandwidths tend to connect with each other [81], and
the P2P network becomes clusterised; that is, high bandwidth hosts are matched with
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other high bandwidth hosts, and low bandwidth hosts are matched together. This is
also known as stratification. It is out of the scope of this thesis to prove whether this
phenomenon also appears when G2G is applied, like in this case, or for different resource
allocation algorithms, however, our neighbour selection policy can in principle be used
in BitTorrent when a peer’s good neighbours have not been discovered yet.
4.5 Implementation
In this section we briefly describe how we created the tools to test our algorithms.
The starting point was Tribler BitTorrent client, which has already been described in
Section 4.3.3. This client has been written using Python [82] programming language.
The part of the program that handles Video on Demand and Live Streaming consists of
several modules, as shown in Figure 4.9. The main components in this section are:
• VideoStatus: This module handles information about the current video sequence
and keeps track of the playback position. It has knowledge of the position of
the sequence inside the torrent and also implements the window used in the G2G
algorithm.
• PiecePickerVOD: Inside the source code, it is implemented as PiecePickerStream-
ing. It implements the piece picking policy of G2G, which means that it has a
knowledge of the current playback position and the download window implemen-
ted in VideoStatus. Therefore, it avoids requesting obsolete pieces. This module is
derived from PiecePicker, which keeps track of all the pieces owned by all the peers
in the swarm and sorts them according to their rarity.
• MovieOnDemandTransport: This module was implemented as VideoOn De-
mandTransport in the source code. It provides an interface between BitTorrent
and a video player. It can start the playback, pause it, resume it and it can push
available data into the player buffer. This counts as playing the video, as far as
Tribler is concerned, and in practice consists in incrementing the playback position.
• StorageWrapper: It handles the received data and has methods that allow to
read it.
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Figure 4.9: Tribler Video Architecture.
• VideoSource and LiveSourceAuth: These modules are used for live streaming.
In this case we cannot create a torrent that contains a hash for all the pieces, since
we do not have all the data when we start broadcasting. VideoSource handles
the live source and injects data into the network, while LiveSourceAuth is used to
create a hash of every single piece and check the integrity of the received data.
Some of these modules have been modified, while a few others have been created.
Figure 4.10 shows the main changes that were introduced. Implementation of the pro-
posed algorithms and their integration with the rest of the system required over 1000
lines of code written in Python [82]. The new piece picking policy has been implemen-
ted in PiecePickerStreaming. It has a method that selects the next piece to pick, which
simply implements the algorithm described in Section 4.4.1. It also contains the neigh-
bour selection policy. This method is called every time we are trying to request a piece
from any of our neighbours. If we have selected a piece that belongs to the base layer,
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Figure 4.10: New modules used for scalable video streaming.
we check if the current peer belongs to the “good peers” set. If it does, we go on with
the request, otherwise we put this piece in an “off-limits” list and we request another
piece. This list is required because some pieces might belong to the base layer and one or
more other layers. Extraction is performed inside VideoOnDemandTransport, while we
defined a new module, IncrementPlaybackPosition, which is responsible for the window
shifts. The interface that makes Tribler “codec-aware” is also implemented in a new
module, ScalableVideoInterface.
4.6 Results
4.6.1 Dataset Description
For our experiments, first of all four uncompressed video sequences have been generated.
All of them consist of the repetition of a ten-second YUV video sequence, which can
be “City”, “Crew”, “Soccer” or “InToTree”. These are commonly used sequences in
testing video compression and they cover different types of content in terms of spatial
and temporal activity. All the YUV sequences that were processed by the encoder had
CIF frame resolution (352× 288 pixels) and a frame rate of 30 fps. The duration of all
sequences was 300 seconds.
Original sequences are shown in Figure 4.11. These have been subsequently encoded
with the parameters shown in Table 4.1, where extraction points have been specified.
An important remark is that compressed videos have multiple spatial and temporal
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YUV Sequence GOP Size Extraction Points [bps]
City 128 frames
CIF, 30Hz
QCIF, 15Hz
384k, 448k, 512k, 640k, 768k
96k, 112k, 128k, 160k, 192k
Crew 64 frames CIF, 30Hz
192k, 224k, 256k, 320k, 384k,
480k, 576k, 672k, 768k, 1024k,
1280k, 1536k
Soccer 64 frames
CIF, 30Hz
QCIF, 15Hz
384k, 448k, 512k, 640k, 768k
96k, 112k, 128k, 160k, 192k
InToTree 64 frames CIF, 30Hz
192k, 256k, 320k, 480k, 576k,
640k, 768k
Table 4.1: Encoding parameters and extraction points.
resolution extraction points, which means that low quality layers only contain a version
of the video with lower frame size and frame rate, and therefore we are de facto only
exploiting one type of scalability. This can be also seen in Table 4.1. On the other
hand, in the encoded version of Crew and InToTree only quality can be degraded. The
specified size for BitTorrent pieces is 32 kB.
As far as the P2P network used for testing is concerned, it consists of three peers.
Two of them are seeders and one is a leecher. Depending on the experiment, they are
allowed to leave and re-join the network or not and, moreover, different limits on the
upload bandwidth of each peer are set. More details about specific upload capacities can
be found in Section 4.6.2 and Section 4.6.3, where the individual experimental set-ups
are described.
4.6.2 Comparison Between a Non-scalable and a Scalable
Codec
In this section, we will compare the performance achieved by WSVC and a non-scalable
video codec. The behaviour of a non-scalable codec is however simulated by handling
a scalable sequence. In order to obtain a non-scalable video, the window described in
Section 4.4.1 only shifts if all the quality layers have been received. The sequence selected
for this experiment is Crew. The sliding window consists of 6 GOPs, for a total duration
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(a) City (b) Crew
(c) Soccer (d) InToTree
Figure 4.11: Original City, Crew, Soccer and InToTree sequences.
of 12.8 s. As far as network configuration is concerned, as we previously mentioned there
are two seeders (Peer 1 and Peer 2) and one leecher (Peer 3). Upload bandwidth limit
has been set to 25 kB/s and 50 kB/s respectively, for a total of 600 kbps. Therefore,
this bandwidth is not enough to download the full-quality video, which has a bit-rate
of 1536kbps. Moreover, Peer 1 periodically disconnects and reconnects to the network,
which causes fluctuations in the download bandwidth of Peer 3.
Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.13 show the download rate and the received video bit-rate in
this case. The received video bit-rate here needs to be intended as the playback bit-rate
and a received rate of 0 kbps means that the system is being paused due to buffering.
Some extracted video frames for the scalable sequence are reported in Figure 4.14 (b)-
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Figure 4.12: Received video bit-rate for Crew, non-scalable case.
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Figure 4.13: Received video bit-rate for Crew, scalable case.
(d), while the original one is shown in (a). The graphs show that in the non-scalable case,
since the overall download bandwidth is low, the system needs to pause several times
during the playback. On the other hand, when using a scalable video codec, the received
video quality follows the download rate, as the variations occur over a period of time
(about 30 s) that is longer than the sliding window (12.8 s). However, variations do not
occur immediately, but after a while. It is important to note that that the received video
bit-rate is in general a little lower than the download bandwidth. One of the reasons is
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(a) Original Frame (b) Frame 8012, Video Bit-rate = 256 kbps
PSNR = 34.29 dB
(c) Frame 2312, Video Bit-rate = 576 kbps
PSNR = 36.40 dB
(d) Frame 8912, Video Bit-rate = 1024 kbps,
PSNR = 38.78 dB
Figure 4.14: Example of decoded frames with different qualities.
that layers may be split on different BitTorrent pieces and BitTorrent pieces can contain
more than one layer. This problem could be solved by exploiting FGS of WSVC. In this
example, we can observe that the received video quality increases towards the end of the
sequence. This happens because the window shrinks when there are no GOPs left to
replace those that have already been decoded. As far as decoded frames are concerned,
in the scalable case a received video bit-rate of 576 kbps still leads to acceptable results
(Figure 4.14 (c)) . However, when it drops to 256 kbps, or even less, quality is very low
(Figure 4.14 (b)). A possible remark is that this comparison might not look fair, as a
non-scalable video sequence with a lower bit-rate could allow a user to receive the video
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in time without pausing. However, this experiment models all those cases in which the
video bit-rate is fixed and the download bandwidth is either temporarily or permanently
too low to sustain this video bit-rate and what we would like to highlight with this test
is the additional flexibility deriving from the SVC approach.
4.6.3 Effects of Neighbour Selection Policy
In this set of experiments, the effect of the neighbour selection algorithm is evaluated.
The impact of this policy is more evident if at least one slow peer is in the swarm, as it
can delay the completion of a piece, which could belong for example to the base layer.
The window size chosen for these tests is tW = 8.53 s. As in the previous tests, the
network consists of two seeders and one leecher, however, there are one “fast” and one
“slow” peer, whose upload limit has been set to 40 kB/s and 3 kB/s respectively. The
latter is the minimum acceptable value that can be set in Tribler. The total upload
bandwidth is therefore 344 kbps. Tests have been performed on City, Crew, Soccer and
InToTree sequences both when neighbour selection policy was active and when it was
not.
Results are shown in Figure 4.15 to 4.22 and in Table 4.2. As far as City and Crew
are concerned, playback is paused only a few times when neighbour selection is not
active, while Soccer and InToTree perform very badly. On the other hand, when this
policy is active, playback never stops. As far as the average video bit-rate is concerned,
City and Crew show very similar performances with and without neighbour selection,
while Soccer and InToTree show a higher received video bit-rate, since the videos have
been downloaded for a much longer time.
According to these results, this policy actually helps in delivering the base layer in
time. However, most of the graphs show drops in received bit-rate, especially Figure 4.16
and Figure 4.20. These suggest that, even if our neighbour selection is active, pieces
from low quality layers might not be received on time, since protection is only given
to the base layer. Therefore, in order to achieve a smoother playback quality, a more
complex policy might be required.
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Figure 4.15: Received video bit-rate for City. Neighbour selection is not active.
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Figure 4.16: Received video bit-rate for City. Neighbour selection is active.
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Figure 4.17: Received video bit-rate for Crew. Neighbour selection is not active.
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Figure 4.18: Received video bit-rate for Crew. Neighbour selection is active.
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Figure 4.19: Received video bit-rate for Soccer. Neighbour selection is not active.
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Figure 4.20: Received video bit-rate for Soccer. Neighbour selection is active.
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Figure 4.21: Received video bit-rate for InToTree. Neighbour selection is not active.
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Figure 4.22: Received video bit-rate for InToTree. Neighbour selection is active.
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Another important remark is that the testing environment used for these experiments
is too limited. However, as performing real tests on a much larger-scale environment
might be very expensive, the most reasonable option is to use a simulation tool.
Sequence Average bit-rate Autopauses (duration)
City w/o N.S. 213 kbps 2 (8.53 s)
City w/ N.S. 215 kbps 0
Crew w/o N.S. 278 kbps 6 (12.8 s)
Crew w/ N.S. 264 kbps 0
Soccer w/o N.S. 345 kbps 64 (136.5 s)
Soccer w/ N.S. 204 kbps 0
InToTree w/o N.S. 435 kbps 82 (174.7 s)
InToTree w/ N.S. 227 kbps 0
Table 4.2: Average received bit-rates with and without neighbour selection policy.
4.7 Conclusion
First of all, in Figure 4.1 we showed a general diagram which can be taken as a reference
for the technique explained in this chapter and in the following ones. Moreover, we
presented two algorithms that allowed efficient streaming of scalable video sequences
over a P2P network. Experimental evaluation showed that our piece picking policy
allowed adaptation of the received video bit-rate to the available resources through
accurate chunk selection. Due to the hierarchical fashion of quality layer priorities, this
policy also aimed at providing a received video quality that was as constant as possible,
in accordance to the conclusions that were drawn from the subjective video analysis in
Chapter 3. Moreover, our neighbour selection policy significantly reduced or eliminated
playback pauses by only requesting base layer pieces to reliable peers. The strongest
aspect of this technique is its compatibility with the original BitTorrent. That is, this
solution could be easily adopted on a large scale and this would be transparent to the
other peers in the swarm, provided that in the future more sequences will be encoded
in WSVC format. Alternatively, it would be straightforward to adapt this solution to
the standard H.264/SVC. On the other hand, these algorithms do not take network
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resources optimisation into account, for example in terms of maximising throughput.
Moreover, while G2G algorithm is suitable for Video on Demand, as it assumes that
peers have different playback position, a T4T-like unchoking mechanism is necessary in
case of live streaming. However, in this context peers might not be able to reciprocate
resources immediately, therefore a different solution is needed. In the next chapter, we
will propose a different approach specifically tackling this problem.
Chapter 5
Joint Free-riding Detection and
Resource Optimisation
This chapter describes a credit-based framework for scalable video transmission over
a P2P network, where the goal is to cut out misbehaving users and optimise resource
allocation at the same time. This is an evolution of our previous approach, described
in Chapter 4. This model is based on direct resource reciprocation, however, time
constraints are more relaxed with respect to BitTorrent. Therefore, we lose compatibility
with the original protocol. For this contribution, we are adopting the following approach:
first of all we consider a real P2P video transmission case and try to identify how this
problem – too difficult to solve analytically – can be simplified introducing constraints,
even if unrealistic. This leads to a much easier problem, for which we propose a solution.
Some of the considerations that are valid for the simplified case are useful when we try
to remove some of these constraints and our proposed approach itself is based on some
of these hypotheses. This chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.1 introduces the
problem; Section 5.2 describes a very simple case study, which will be useful to deal with a
more complex problem; Section 5.3 discusses the relevant related techniques; Section 5.4
illustrates the proposed approach; Section 5.5 briefly discusses how the experimental
evaluation framework has been implemented; Section 5.6 presents the simulation results;
and finally, Section 5.7 concludes the chapter by analysing the pros and cons of this
approach.
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Figure 5.1: A P2P TV scenario.
5.1 Problem Description
In our previous approach, we did not consider the problem of resource reciprocation,
fairness and optimal resource allocation. In order to achieve a P2P system for scalable
video streaming that addresses these aspects, our research objectives are now to:
• Propose an algorithm that identifies free-riders and isolates them from the rest of
the system, to reward well-behaving users.
• At the same time, optimise resource allocation. This is to be intended as maximising
the usage of the upload capacities of all the peers in the network (that intend to
cooperate).
First of all, we illustrate a realistic case and analyse its related issues, then we
introduce some hypotheses that simplify the system and study a reduced version of the
problem.
In a real scenario, we can suppose to transmit a scalable video sequence over a
BitTorrent-like P2P network. The context is now real-time streaming. The video is
composed of two quality layers, corresponding to different bit-rates. The base layer has
a bit-rate of 256 kbps, while this layer plus the (only) enhancement layer have a bit-rate
of 512 kbps. Since the size of the P2P chunk is 32 kB and the source encodes one GOP
every two seconds, in this time interval two base layer pieces and two enhancement layer
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pieces will be generated. The network consists of N = 100 peers, which have an upload
bandwidth of 64 kB/s plus two sources, used to inject the content into the network.
One of them shares the base layer of the sequence only, while the other uploads both
layers to the remaining peers. These two sources have an upload capacity of 256 kB/s
and 128 kB/s respectively, which is not enough to upload the sequence to all the peers.
This can be however achieved using the resources of the other users of the network.
Figure 5.1 illustrates this scenario with 10 peers. If we want to solve the problem of
optimal resource allocation in this scenario, it is not a simple tasks, as there are several
degrees of freedom: what is the strategy the source nodes should follow? how many
users should they upload data to at the same time? what is the best strategy the other
peers should adopt? In order to find a solution to these issues, we will first study a
simplified version of this scenario.
5.2 A Simplified Case Study
Given the scenario introduced in the previous section, it is possible to identify the
following hypotheses, which simplify the problem we are trying to solve. Most of them
are unrealistic and have very restrictive constraints, however more degrees of freedom
will be added later on:
• There is only one source injecting content into the network.
• There are no constraints on the download capacity of the peers.
• All the peers have the same upload capacity.
• The video is not scalable.
• All the peers know the current state of the network, e.g. who their neighbours are
what are the pieces owned by them.
• The network is static. No peers are allowed to join or leave the network.
• There are no node failures and the network latency is always zero.
• All the peers wish to cooperate, e.g. there are no free-riders or users that inject
polluted content into the network.
Joint Free-riding Detection and Resource Optimisation 96
• The nodes are strongly connected; that is, there is a path from every node to every
other node in the network.
The aim of each individual peer is to receive each GOP of the sequence within a
certain time. On the other hand, the objective of the service provider is that all the
peers receive the video sequence in time and their playback position is approximately
the same. In other words, peers should be synchronised.
5.2.1 An Analytical Solution
Under these circumstances, we would like to find the best resources allocation profile.
This is the profile that allows all the peers to receive a certain GOP within the minimum
possible time. According to the original BitTorrent protocol, a peer can start uploading
a piece only after it has been completed downloaded (and verified). In other words, a
piece is the minimum unit of content that can be shared (even if made of sub-pieces [1]).
In order to use the resources of a peer as soon as possible, this peer needs to have
something to share as soon as possible. If we consider a sequence that consists of only
one GOP, consisting of only one piece, intuitively the allocation that allows it to be
received in the shortest time by all peers is the one in which all the peers unchoke1 the
same user. In fact, when only the source owns the piece, if it only unchokes one peer,
this peer completes the download of the piece in the shortest possible time. When this
happens, both peers should unchoke a new peer (the same) and so on. Since we assumed
that the source and the peers have the same upload capacity, if we consider that the
time required to transfer a piece from the source to the first unchoked peer is τ , it can
be proven (for example by induction) that the time δN required to transfer this GOP to
N peers is given by:
δN = τ +
τ
2
+ · · ·+ τ
N
= τ
N∑
n=1
1
n
. (5.1)
For τ = 1, this is the sum of the first N terms of the harmonic series [83]. Because of
the properties of this series, if N →∞, then δN →∞. Therefore, if we set a maximum
acceptable threshold for the playback delay, there is a maximum number of users that
1We remind that, according to BitTorrent jargon, unchoking means uploading data to a certain user.
Joint Free-riding Detection and Resource Optimisation 97
can be part of the system. This happens even in this unrealistic scenario where there
is no limit on the download bandwidth and we do not even consider which parts of
the piece are downloaded from which peer. If the source generates a GOP at regular
intervals, each peer should forward the last piece they received. Similarly, all the peers
that are uploading the same piece should unchoke the same peer. This way, all the
peers are kept constantly busy and new pieces are made available for upload as quickly
as possible. In this case, the number of peers that are currently uploading a piece is
limited and it depends on the interval between two GOPs. Therefore, also in this case
we have a maximum number of users that can take advantage of the service within a
(set) acceptable delay.
It is not realistic to consider GOPs that are made by only one piece. We will now
consider the propagation of a one-GOP sequence that is made of M pieces. In this
case, the problem of allocation becomes much more complicated. First, we will show
an example where M = 2, then we will consider more generic values for it. Let us now
suppose that the original GOP is divided into two pieces. The source now unchokes two
peers at the same time, uploading two different pieces. When the download is complete,
the scenario becomes similar to the previous example. However, in the next phase, peers
owning different pieces should unchoke different peers. Moreover, they should unchoke
peers that do not already own the other piece. This is because this peer’s resources
would be already fully exploited and the resources of another peer would not be used.
When all the peers own something to share, they need to upload it to other peers. The
strategy used at this point is irrelevant, as regardless of the number of peers that a peer
unchokes or the number of the peers that are transmitting the same piece to another
user, the time required to upload a piece to all the other users is the same. Therefore,
in this case, we have an “initialisation” phase, during which all peers need to obtain
something to share and another phase in which all peers exchange data. Moreover, the
duration of the second phase, under these circumstances, does not depend on the number
of peers in the network. An example with N = 10 shows that δN = 2.9289 τ if M = 1
and δN = 2.2873 τ if M = 2. Therefore, dividing a GOP into smaller parts reduces the
maximum delay.
If we now consider a network with N peers and M = N , we can observe that the
source transmits 1/N of the GOP to N peers in τ seconds. All the peers now have
something to share and they can upload it to the other users. Even if we do not consider
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the source, which may be transmitting the following GOP, the time required to upload
this part of the GOP to the others is ((N − 1)/N)τ < τ . Therefore, this system is
virtually scalable and it can be used to transmit videos if the interval between two
GOPs is greater than τ .
In the original BitTorrent protocol, the number of chunks per GOP depends on
the video bit-rate, as the piece length is fixed. In realistic scenarios, we have that
M  N . Assuming that N/M is an integer value for simplicity, we consider two possible
initialisations:
• The source unchokes all the peers at the same time: in this case, the initialisa-
tion phase has the duration expressed by Eq. (5.2), while the exchange phase is
calculated as tex = ((M − 1)/M) · τ .
tinit = τ
N
M
. (5.2)
• The source unchokes one peer per piece and all the peers that own the same piece
upload it to the same user. In this case, the initialisation time is calculated in
Eq. (5.3), while the exchange phase has the same duration as before.
tinit = τ
1 + (N/M)−1∑
n=1
1
1 +Mn
 . (5.3)
In both cases, the initialisation phase duration depends on the number of peers in the
network, while the second one does not. However, it depends on the overall upload
capacity of the peers (as it would have an influence on τ). Table 5.1 shows different
results for the initialisation time as computed by Eq. (5.3), depending on the number of
chunks and peers. It is clear that dividing a GOP into a larger number of parts leads,
theoretically, to better performances.
These scenarios are not realistic, as many of the constraints they are based on are
not. However, some of the ideas that emerged from them could still be valid in more
generic cases. The aim of this study is not to find a comprehensive solution to the
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M = 3 M = 9 M = 27 M = 81 M = 243
N = 3 τ — — — —
N = 9 1.3928 τ τ — — —
N = 27 1.7703 τ 1.1526 τ τ — —
N = 81 2.1405 τ 1.2846 τ 1.0538 τ τ —
N = 243 2.5081 τ 1.4099 τ 1.0986 τ 1.0183 τ τ
Table 5.1: Initialisation times for different values of M and N .
considered problem. It should rather raise questions and suggest ideas that will be used
both in our proposed approach and in our future work.
For example, one key aspect is that in order to keep upload channels busy, peers
should always have content other users are interested in. In particular, different users
need to have different content. In order for this to happen, it is reasonable to upload
data to the most deprived peer, as we increase the likelihood that this peer owns content
that is interesting for other users. However, this consideration is not valid when there
are free-riders in the network. In fact, in order to achieve fairness, the amount of data
each user receives should roughly correspond to the amount of data it uploads. These
two aspects are not related, and this is an issue we will consider in our technique.
5.2.2 Additional Problems
Let us now analyse the constraints we previously introduced. Some of them will be
removed when proposing our approaches, whilst the others might provide ideas for future
work, as discussed in Chapter 7.
There is more than one source injecting content into the network If we con-
sider a scalable video, they might have different versions of the sequence. These sources
should work in parallel and be coordinated by some authority.
There are constraints on the maximum download bandwidth of the peers
This factor is not normally considered, as it is not the bottleneck of P2P systems.
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However, this implies that there should be a limit on the number of peers unchoking
another one, or peers could be allowed to unchoke more than one peer at a time (to
reduce the transfer rates towards them).
Peers have different upload capacities This aspect invalidates the nice symmetry
and synchronisation properties that we observed in the simple case. First, we could
consider a discrete set of upload capacities, then we could allow this parameter to be
completely random.
The video is scalable Dividing GOPs into pieces of the same length might not be
a good idea. Moreover, this strict rule was the main reason that pushed us to exploit
only one type of scalability in our work so far. Moreover, scalability could be also used
to “synchronise” peers with different upload or download capacities.
Peers do not know the current state of the network Peers in general have a
very limited knowledge of the network. Every decision needs to be based on this. Some
concepts like friendship or reputation have been already introduced in other systems,
but they can be extended.
Peers are allowed to join or leave the network The system should adapt to these
changes and ideally this problem should be transparent to the other users.
The network is unreliable Original BitTorrent uses TCP. However, the User Da-
tagram Protocol (UDP) has been used in P2P systems. Moreover, peers might have
different response latencies.
There are free-riders and malicious peers Not all the users wish to cooperate.
Another issue is that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between a peer with a bad
connection and a free-rider. Credit-based models usually see P2P networks as markets
and define rules that make systems resilient with respect to these attacks. Improvements
might be also given by applying game theory.
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Peers need to establish a connection with a limited number of users Creating
the overlay network can be an issue. Original BitTorrent is based on centralised trackers,
while distributed ones already exist. The creation of such network could be based on
friendship relationships. Properties of these networks, like topology, should be taken
into account.
5.3 Related Work
Before proceeding to the description of our proposed approach, we are going to present
a few related techniques. They are divided into two groups. First, we are going to ana-
lyse some frameworks for resource reciprocation in P2P systems, with a particular focus
on those that are specifically designed for video transmission, either scalable or non-
scalable. An important remark is that, in principle, systems in the latter category could
be extended to support scalable video sequences by designing a chunk selection mech-
anism which is aware of the codec characteristics. Second, we will consider techniques
that optimise resource utilisation in P2P networks.
5.3.1 A Simple File-sharing Model
In [84], Buragohain et al. proposed a game theoretic framework for incentives provision
in a P2P network. This study was performed in 2003 and therefore it is as old as the
original BitTorrent protocol. Such a system is modelled as a non-cooperative game, as
users compete for shared resources and can decide not to give any contribution. The
aim of each player is to maximise their own payoff or utility function, while their level
of contribution is the strategy they adopt. The authors focus on the concept of Nash
Equilibrium [8]; that is, they analyse those cases in which players cannot increase their
utility by unilaterally changing their strategy.
The set of players is made of N peers P1, . . . , PN and the utility function associated
to peer Pi is Ui. Finally, the contribution given by the ith peer is denoted by Di. This
quantity is a continuous variable and can correspond, for example, to a certain amount
of data shared in a fixed period of time and can be also described in terms of costs
and therefore money, if multiplied by a cost factor ci. This contribution can be also
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expressed using a dimensionless quantity defined as
di ≡ Di
D0
, (5.4)
where D0 is a fixed measure of contribution. The incentive mechanism will aim to ensure
that each peer contributes at least D0 to the system.
Another important feature of this system is the use of a benefit matrix B. This is a
N ×N matrix, where Bij is the value of the contribution peer Pi made to Pj and it can
be also measured in actual money. In general, Bij ≥ 0 and Bii = 0 ∀i. The following
dimensionless parameters are also introduced:
bij =
Bij
ci
, bi =
∑
j
bij, bav =
1
N
∑
i
bi. (5.5)
In these equations, bi is the total benefit that peer i can obtain from the other users of
the network and bav is the average benefit for all the peers in the system.
The basic idea behind this model is that if a contribution made by a peer is small, the
benefit it gains will also be small. In practice, a peer Pj accepts a request from Pi with
a probability p(di) and rejects it with probability 1 − p(di). This probability function
should be monotonically increasing, in order to satisfy the properties previously stated.
The function used in [84] is defined as follows:
p(d) =
dα
1 + dα
, α > 0. (5.6)
It is easy to observe that p(0) = 0 and p(d) → 1 for large values of d. For large values
of α, this function has a steep step. Therefore, there exists a threshold under which a
peer has a high probability of rejection. An important consideration is that acceptance
or rejection only depends on the total contribution to the system.
Considering the quantities that have been previously defined, it is possible to define
the following utility function ui for each peer Pi
ui = −di + p(di)
∑
j
bijdij, bii ≡ 0. (5.7)
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The first term here indicates that there is a cost associated to joining the system (di),
which linearly increases with respect to the data contributed by a user i. On the other
hand, the benefit given by joining the system depends on how much the other users are
willing to cooperate (dj). It is possible to prove that neither di = 0 nor di → ∞ are
optimal strategies.
As far as the two-player game is concerned, Buragohain shows that there exist two
Nash Equilibria [8] if the benefit b given by joining the network is above a certain
threshold, which depends on the chosen probability function p(d). One of this equilibria
denotes a high contribution from both peers and is indicated by dhi, while the other
corresponds to a smaller amount of contributions by the users and is denoted by dlo.
Experimental results show that dhi is a stable Nash Equilibrium, while dlo is unstable.
Therefore, depending on the initial contribution values chosen by the peers they will both
converge to the desirable strategy or leave the system empty-handed. These concepts
can be extended to the N-player game.
The solution proposed in [84] is important because it shows that in such a framework
there exists a threshold in the benefit received by users under which it is not convenient
to join the system. On the other hand, a possible limitation is that only pure strategies
are considered here, while no mixed strategies are allowed. Moreover, given the definition
of probability function p, it appears the single decisions to accept or refuse requests from
other peers depend on their total contribution to the system, rather than the benefit
directly obtained from them.
5.3.2 Live Multimedia Streaming in a P2P Social Network
The solution proposed in [85] aims at designing incentive mechanisms in the specific
context of live video streaming. In this model, the reward depends not only on the
availability of data, but also on the quality of the received video. Another characteristic
of such a system is the presence of very strict delay constraints, as already mentioned
for other BitTorrent-based video streaming systems. Moreover, the P2P network itself
is modelled as a social network, where users can cheat to improve their payoff or tamper
with the shared data. Social relations among peers (e.g. friendship) are however not
considered.
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In this system, a video bit-stream of bit-rate B is divided into chunks of length M .
This video is originally stored on a server. A tracker-like mechanism is implemented to
allow peers to obtain a list of their neighbours. Finally, time is divided into rounds of
length τ . First of all, a two-player interaction will be analysed from a game theoretic
point of view. The payoff function of the game for one single round is defined as follows:
pi1(a1, a2) = (a2P21)g1 − a1c1
= (a2P21)g1 − a1 M
W1τ
,
pi2(a1, a2) = (a1P12)g2 − a2c2
= (a1P12)g2 − a2 M
W2τ
. (5.8)
These equations contain several terms. First of all, ai is the action taken by peer i and it
is either 1 or 0, depending on the decision of i to cooperate or not respond to the other
peer’s request. Pij is the probability that a chunk is successfully transferred from i to
j, while g ∈ [0, 1] denotes the gain a certain user receives when receiving a video chunk;
it is a subjective measure. Wi is the upload bandwidth of peer i. Finally, ci is the cost
associated to cooperation and it is measured in terms of percentage of bandwidth used
to transmit one chunk in one round. There are two terms in the equation. The first one
is the gain of user i with respect to the action of the other peer, while the second is the
cost, which depends on their own action. If the game is only played for one round, the
only action profile (a1, a2) that satisfies Nash Equilibrium [8] is (0, 0), similarly to what
happens in the game theoretic problem called prisoner’s dilemma [86]. The same holds
if the game is played for a finite number of times and the termination time is known
to both users. However, in these systems, users do not exactly know when the other
peers will leave the game. Therefore, other Nash Equilibria exist and the game can be
modelled as an infinitely repeated game.
In this case, an averaged payoff function over all the rounds of the game Ui(s) is
considered, where s = (s1, s2) is the strategy profile for the two players. For this game,
the set of feasible and enforceable payoffs is given by
V1 = convex hull {(v1, v2) | ∃(a1, a2) with (pi1(a1, a2), pi2(a1, a2)) = (v1, v2)}
∩ {(pi1(x), pi2(x)) | pi1(x), pi2(x) ≥ 0} . (5.9)
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π1
π2
(P21 g1 – M/(W1 τ),
P12 g2 – M/(W2 τ))
( – M/(W1 τ), P12 g2)
(P21 g1, – M/(W2 τ))
(0,0)
V1
Figure 5.2: Feasible and enforceable payoff profiles.
where (a1, a2) ∈ {0, 1}, as previously stated and x = (x1, x2) is the set of the average
strategies for the infinitely repeated game. These payoff profiles are also shown in
Figure 5.2. The average strategy of each player is defined as xi = limt→∞
∑T
j=0 a
(j)
i /T ,
where a
(j)
i is the strategy adopted by i during round j and T is the total number
of rounds. For the infinitely repeated game there exists an infinite number of Nash
Equilibrium strategies. However, not all of them are acceptable from the point of view
of the users of the social network. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce some more
bounds, or refinements of the Nash Equilibrium:
• Pareto Optimality: It means that it is not possible to increase the payoff of a peer
without decreasing the the others’. This subset corresponds to the two segments
on the edge of the convex hull between point (P21g1−M/(W1τ), P12g2−M/(W2τ))
and the two intersections with axes pi1(x) = 0, pi2(x) = 0.
• Proportional Fairness: A payoff profile that is proportionally fair can be achieved
if the product U1(s)U2(s) is maximised. This corresponds to maximising pi1(x)pi2(x)
at each round.
• Absolute Fairness: This solution is not always Pareto-optimal. However, this
concept can be applied on many occasions. According to this criterion, the payoff
of every player in the game should be the same, e.g. pi1(x
∗) = pi2(x∗).
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It is possible to prove that the solutions found by applying absolute and proportional
fairness are not cheat-proof. However, when cheating on their private information, peers
can maximise their payoff reporting PjigiWi = M/τ . The corresponding strategy profile
is x∗ = (1, 1), which means that users always cooperate. The corresponding payoff profile
is
v =
(
P21g1 − M
W1τ
, P12g2 − M
W2τ
)
. (5.10)
This forms a Nash Equilibrium, is Pareto optimal and cheat-proof, as it already assumes
that peers may be cheating about their private information. Other information peers
can cheat on is the list of chunks in their buffer. This reduces the number of requests
from other users, while getting rewards from other peers. To avoid this, peers should
not upload more chunks than they receive from the other one.
For this two-player game, a cheat-proof strategy is obtained when all the users report
false values of their private information. Therefore, transmitting such values is useless.
In practice, in the two-player game, peers will upload data to peers they assume to be
good enough to receive data in exchange. Moreover, they will not upload more data
then they actually download. This is a revisitation of the original BitTorrent unchoking
mechanism.
For the multiple user scenario, new challenges are presented, as in bigger networks
links between users might sometimes be busy and packets can be delayed or lost. Two
types of attacks are also considered: incomplete chunks attack and pollution attacks.
Under these circumstances, the challenge is to distinguish between malicious and unin-
tentional misbehaviour. Therefore, a credit line is introduced. This is the maximum gap
allowed between the number of complete and unpolluted chunks two peers download.
It is in practice as a “download threshold”, since if a peer tries to cross this line by
requesting more data, the user that has received the smallest contribution will reject all
of the other peer’s requests. This rule is valid for all the relationships between a peer
and its neighbours. The aim of this rule is to stimulate cooperation among peers and
to add some tolerance when favours cannot be instantly returned. Moreover, this limits
the damage free-riders or malicious peers in general can cause to the other users.
Another goal is to detect these malicious users. Assuming that the unsuccessful
transmission of a chunk is modelled as a Bernoulli random process [87] and applying the
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Central Limit Theorem [88], it is possible to prove that:
Cs(i)(j, t)− Cu(j)(i, t)Pji ∼ N
(
0, Cu(j)(i, t)Pji(1− Pji)
)
, (5.11)
where Cs(i)(j, t) is defined as the number of chunks that i successfully receives from j
per round and Cu(j)(i, t) is the number of chunks that i has requested to j and j has
agreed to transmit by time t. This quantity needs to be multiplied by Pji, which has
already been defined as the probability to transmit one chunk from j to i in one round.
Assuming that a malicious peer will never send a good or complete chunk, it is possible
to set a threshold that corresponds to the maximum false positive malicious users rate
depending on this Gaussian distribution.
An important remark stated in this work is that in some cases it is more convenient
for a selfish peer to download only from the source, without sharing any data with the
others. In this case, it will always refuse to cooperate with other peers. However, it is
reasonable to assume the streaming server as often busy. Therefore cooperation among
otherwise selfish peers can be enforced. For a selfish peer i which is cooperating with
the others, the following strategy is defined:
• Mark all the other peers as selfish.
• Send a request to the peer that has the highest probability of successfully trans-
mitting a chunk within a round and apply the malicious behaviour detection rule
to it.
• When receiving a request, accept it if the peer is not marked as malicious and the
credit line has not been crossed.
It is possible to prove that in the case of no attacks the strategy described in this
section strategy is sub-game perfect, cheat-proof and, if none of the peers stops receiving
chunks, strongly Pareto optimal. On the other hand, experimental evaluation shows that
malicious users either are detected by the proposed mechanism or can only cause very
limited damage.
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5.3.3 Overview of Other Techniques Based on Game Theory
Other systems have been proposed [89–94]. In many of them, a utility, payoff or welfare
function is defined to measure the benefit gained by a certain user or a group when
receiving data from other peers minus the upload costs they incur.
In addition, in [89], Park and van der Schaar consider the problem of content pro-
duction and sharing together. They also analyse what are the conditions under which it
is convenient for a peer to cooperate in a P2P system. Moreover, a few pricing schemes
are also proposed. A similar scheme was proposed in [95] in 2006.
In [90, 91] a “foresighted” resource reciprocation model is proposed. The main idea
is that peers should upload data to other users considering how this action will impact
their behaviour in the future. Moreover, peers do not just decide which users they want
to upload to, but also the scale of this contribution. This is achieved using a Markov
Decision Process [96] framework. Simulations show a significant improvement in the
results, however a practical implementation of this system could be computationally
very expensive.
A few more techniques analysed are based on evolutionary game theory [97]. In [92–
94], peers try to adapt their strategies to the feedback they get from other users. In
particular, in [92] peers autonomously decide if they should keep their current list of
neighbours or update it. On the other hand, in [94] peers are allowed to behave co-
operatively. Moreover, they can either decide to download only from peers in their own
group or act as agents (e.g. “superpeers”) and contribute to their group downloading
data from outside it.
Finally, some properties of the network (like those described in [42, 98–101]) can,
in principle, be exploited in general P2P systems, not just for video streaming. So
far, there are examples of systems that consider proximity of nodes [102, 103] or social
relationships [104] when deciding which connections should be established between peers.
The results presented in these works show that these systems perform better than the
traditional ones.
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5.3.4 P2P Network as a Graph
The following techniques consider the issue of optimal resource allocation in P2P trans-
mission. We now consider the solution proposed by Huang et al. [105]. The over-
lay network is modelled as a graph G = (V,E). V represents the set of vertices
(peer nodes) and E is the set of links among them in the overlay network. Each of
these links (i, j) ∈ E is associated with a communication delay d(i,j), ∀(i, j) ∈ E.
These links are considered to be symmetric and to satisfy the triangular inequality (e.g.
d(i,j) + d(j,k) ≥ d(i,k) ∀i, j, k ∈ V ). Maximum download and upload capacities are defined
for every peer as Ii and Oi and they are measured in terms of units (e.g. minimum P2P
chunk size) per second.
The stream is generated by only one source S, while all the other peers r ∈ R ⊂ V are
receivers. This stream can be either received from the source only, or (indirectly) through
the other peers via multiple paths. The rate of this (non-scalable) stream is denoted by
s, while fij is the streaming rate from peer i to peer j. The stream from the source to
a receiver r is the unicast flow U to r, which may be formed by several fractional flows
p ∈ U . Each of these flows is associated with a delay tp =
∑
(i,j)∈p d(i,j). The latency of
the unicast flow is the maximum latency of the fractional flows t = maxp∈U tp. Given
these assumptions and definitions, the problem is formulated as follows:
Minimise t,
subject to: ∑
(i,j)
d(i,j)x
r
ijm ≤ t with xrijm ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(i, j) ∈ E, ∀r ∈ R, ∀m, (5.12)
where xrijm is set to 1 only if the path of the m-th flow from the source to a receiver r
includes the link from i to j. This condition simply indicates that t is the maximum
delay of all the flows to all the receivers. In other words,
xrijm = df rijm/se ∀(i, j) ∈ E, ∀r ∈ R, ∀m. (5.13)
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Here, f rijm is the m-th fractional flow rate on (i, j) to r. The maximum upload and
download rate of each peer also needs to be considered:
s∑
m=1
∑
r:r∈R
f rijm ≤ yij, ∀(i, j) ∈ E , (5.14)∑
j:(i,j)∈E
yij ≤ Oi, ∀i ∈ V, (5.15)∑
j:(j,i)∈E
yji ≤ Ii, ∀i ∈ V. (5.16)
In Eq. (5.14) to (5.16), yij is the aggregated flow rate on link (i, j). Over all the incoming
(outgoing) connections, the sum of aggregated flows cannot exceed the download (up-
load) capacity of each node. Here, s denotes the number of fractional flows, therefore
0 < m ≤ s. This algorithm achieves a delay which can be approximated by O(√log(n)),
where n is the number of peers in the network. This paper works with data flows instead
of considering packet exchanges, however, it is relevant to our study, as it states that in
order for all the peers to be served, the sum of all the upload rates of all the peers needs
to be greater than the sum of all the desired rates, which is a statement we are going to
extend for the scalable case.
5.3.5 A Push-based Approach for a Mesh Topology
The problem of minimising delays in video transmission is connected to the problem
of optimising streaming rates. In [106], Picconi et al. describe a mesh-based approach
which can achieve optimal streaming rates, similarly to tree-based solutions. This is
obtained by uploading the latest useful chunk to the most deprived peer. The idea of
sending data to the most deprived node in a network can be already found in [107],
where random useful packets are forwarded.
The key component of this algorithm is the set of video chunks each peer Pi owns,
which can be defined as C(Pi). Assuming that the set of neighbours of Pi is Ni, the most
deprived peer is the one that satisfies maxPk∈Ni {|C(Pi) \ C(Pk)|}. In other words, it is
the peer that maximises the amount of chunks a certain peer owns and its neighbours do
not. According to the original study [107], optimal streaming rates are obtained when
random chunks are forwarded. However, the experimental evaluation performed in [106]
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Figure 5.3: An example of SPPM overlay network. Two complementary multicast trees are
maintained to route the data from the source of the stream to the set of users.
suggests that other techniques, for example forwarding the latest useful chunk, achieve
similar results. An important remark is that the “latest useful” chunk in this context
should be intended in terms of timestamp (e.g. position in the video bit-stream).
5.3.6 Stanford Peer-to-Peer Multicast
The system proposed in [108] is based on Stanford Peer-to-Peer Multicast (SPPM). This
is a push-tree solution where several complementary multicast trees are created. These
trees form the overlay network, whose root node is the source S of the video. Different
packets are distributed using different trees. Figure 5.3 shows an example with two; in
this case odd and even packets are distributed through the two possible different paths
from S to peers P1 . . . P8.
The use of a push-tree solution as opposed to mesh-pull can lead to a better per-
formance of the system [108]. However, creating and maintaining trees might be com-
putationally expensive, especially in big networks. In this case, if a new peer wants to
Joint Free-riding Detection and Resource Optimisation 112
join the network, it needs to contact the source. Similar to a BitTorrent tracker, the
source returns a random list of peers. The new peer then selects the best parent nodes
according to available throughput, distance from the source in logical hops and end-to-
end delay. Finally, it connects to only one parent for each of the multicast trees. Every
time a peer leaves the swarm, its children need to repeat this procedure and connect to
another parent. Since connecting to a descendant creates loops that are not connected
to the source, each peer keeps a list of all its ancestors (for each tree). While connected
to the network, each peer will receive data from its parents and will forward it to its
children.
As far as video scalability is concerned a “content-aware prioritisation” is used in case
of network congestion. Each packet is assigned a different importance, which depends
on the distortion-rate reduction given by its decoding. The packet’s dependencies are
also considered. That is, if a layered video is used, the base layer of the sequence has
the highest priority, while enhancement layers are only transmitted if there is enough
spare capacity in the system.
This tree-based solution does not consider potential free-riders. In fact, a peer might
connect to several parents, while refusing to upload data to its children. In other words,
a parent will always upload data to its children, if the network conditions allow it,
regardless of their behaviour. The problem of peers tampering with the data is also not
considered. However, this issue could be easily solved requesting a hash of each packet
from a trusted entity (e.g. the source S).
5.3.7 Other Systems and Final Considerations
Finally, an experimental study [109] performed by Liang et al. addresses the issue of
performance versus complexity of the system, proposing different scheduling techniques.
This study is also important because it shows the impact of the network topology on
the network and it suggests that peers with higher capacity should be linked to a larger
number of peers. Social networking aspects are not considered here, though.
On the other hand, another study, performed specifically on PPLive [110] shows that
the behaviour of IPTV users is the same as regular users. This can be a critical factor,
as many peers might simultaneously leave at the beginning of commercials breaks and
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List of Symbols
Pi Peer i
ci Upload capacity of Pi
qi Quality layer i
bi Bit-rate of quality layer qi
bit Target bit-rate for Pi
∆max Maximum acceptable credit or debit a peer can have towards
another peer
S Content source
N Set of peers in the network, including the content source
|N | Number of peers in the network, including the source
Ni Neighbours of Pi
N∗i Non free-riding neighbours of Pi
χsk(i, t) Number of chunks Pk has sent to Pi at time t
χrk(i, t) Number of complete and unpolluted chunks Pk has received
from Pi at time t
δ(Pi) Deprivation of Pi
ϕidep Deprivation factor of Pi, as computed by another peer
ϕicr Credit factor of Pi, as computed by another peer
α, β Weighting factors for ϕidep and ϕ
i
cr respectively
ri Chunk request, sent from Pi
s(ri) Score assigned to ri
Table 5.2: List of symbols in use for the proposed approach.
re-join the network at the end of them. This article also points out that slow start is a
problem that needs to be specifically addressed.
5.4 Proposed Approach
Our approach is based on the conclusions drawn from the simplified scenario. We are
now considering peers with limited upload capacities and different upload speeds. A
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Figure 5.4: Block diagram for the proposed approach.
fraction of the user behaves as a free-rider. We are simulating the network using ns-
2 [111] simulator, to deal with network unreliability. Video scalability helps achieve
fairness among users. However, we still assume that peers cannot leave the network
during the whole simulation and we also create the overlay network according to the
standard BitTorrent protocol. That is, we are using a BitTorrent tracker.
This contribution is also published in [13, 16]. It is a credit-based framework for
scalable P2P video streaming with a focus on optimal resource allocation. Our idea
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is to integrate minimum-delay streaming functionalities within an incentive provision
mechanism. Scalable video coding forms an integral part of our framework, as peers
are discouraged from downloading videos with a quality which is higher than the one
they can provide other users with. To the best of our knowledge, optimising streaming
rates and finding incentives for users to cooperate are usually considered as separate
problems. Most real systems, however, need to deal with both at the same time. Our
technique considers both issues, while aiming at achieving nearly optimal performance.
An important remark is that this approach is not compatible with the original BitTor-
rent. Therefore, for the purpose of testing we have not integrated this approach within
a P2P client, but we used ns-2 network simulator, as it allowed to perform tests with a
higher number of users.
The block diagram in Figure 5.4 summarises our proposed technique. The blocks
representing our contributions are the Chunk Selection and Resource Allocation in the
reference diagram (Figure 4.1). The first one is a modification of the technique proposed
in Chapter 4, as described in the following section, while the second is a framework for
resources allocation that takes decisions based on the behaviour of the peers (such as
number of accepted requests) and information regarding their downloaded chunk map.
In the figure, “Credit” indicates whether a peer has run out of credit and needs to
be marked as a free-rider. Finally, credit and deprivation factors will be defined in
Section 5.4.4. A list of the symbols used in the next sections can be found in Table 5.2.
5.4.1 Piece Picking Policy
This packet scheduling algorithm is similar to our solution presented in Section 4.4.1,
however, due to completeness, we will briefly describe it, illustrating the key differences.
A sliding window, containing a fixed number of GOPs that follow the current playback
position is defined. The number of GOPs inside the window usually corresponds to 10-20
seconds of video. Inside the window, chunks have a priority that depends on the quality
layer they belong to. Inside each layer, the rarest pieces are requested first. In contrast
with the approach described in Section 4.4.1, however, this also holds for the base layer.
In fact, as the playback positions of the peers are synchronised, a sequential policy would
imply that many peers would be interested in the same chunk, whereas applying a rarest-
first policy increases diversity. At regular intervals, the system performs a window shift
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Figure 5.5: Sliding window for scalable live video streaming, showing high and low priority
requests.
and checks how many quality layers of the current GOP have been completely received.
If at least the base layer has been received, it will be decoded, otherwise the GOP will
be skipped, as in this case the system cannot be paused. In this case, the received video
bit-rate will be set to 0.
The sliding window is also shown in Figure 5.5. In a) the peer has just joined the
network. It calculates the current playback position from its neighbours and there is a
short pre-buffering before the first window shift. Figure 5.5 b) shows the final moments
of the pre-buffering. The peer has already downloaded all the chunks it could afford to
upload and it sends low-priority requests to its neighbours. After the window shifts in c),
the completely received quality layers are decoded, while the partial ones are discarded.
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5.4.2 Credit-Based Framework
In our system, a credit line mechanism is used. However, as it was previously introduced,
two different types of requests are defined: regular – or high priority – and low priority.
Regular requests, when accepted, will be considered when computing the calculation of
the current credit, while the latter will not be taken into account. This is necessary,
as we prove that peers should not request data they cannot afford to upload, but on the
other hand we would also like to exploit the spare resources in the system. We consider
the case in which peers have different upload capacities and we use SVC. Under these
circumstances, quality layers are subsets of the original bit-stream associated to different
SNR.
Proposition 5.1. Let us consider a peer Pi whose upload capacity is ci and a layered
scalable video whose bit-rates of layers q0, . . . , qmax are b0, . . . , bmax. If this peer down-
loads data belonging to quality layers qj, . . . , qmax, such that bj > ci, it will be eventually
marked as a free-rider by its neighbours.
Proof. A peer Pi is marked as a free-rider by its neighbours Pk ∈ Ni if χsk(i, t)−χrk(i, t) >
∆max for any k | Pk ∈ Ni, where Ni is again the set of neighbours of Pi, χsk(i, t) is
the number of chunks Pk sent to Pi at time t, χ
r
k(i, t) is the number of complete and
unpolluted chunks Pk received from Pi at time t and ∆max is the credit line set by all
the peers in the network. Considering the most favourable case for peer Pi, which is
when χrk(i, t) = χ
s
i (k, t) (e.g. there are no transmission errors), Pk will cooperate with Pi
if limt→∞(χsi (k, t)/χ
s
k(i, t)) = 1. If this condition is not satisfied then, for an arbitrarily
long time t′, χsk(i, t
′) − χsi (k, t′) > ∆max will be verified. As χs depends on the upload
capacity of a certain peer, a user should not try to download more data then it can afford
to upload. Therefore, for the specific case of scalable video transmission, a peer should
not aim to download a video with a bit-rate that is higher than its upload capacity. It
also follows that free-riders and users with an upload capacity that is lower than the
bit-rate of layer q0 will be cut out of the system.
This result can also be interpreted as follows: if a peer tries to download more data
than it can upload, its behaviour is comparable to free-riding. In some cases, however,
there might be some spare resources in the system. Therefore, in order to fully exploit
the available capacity, low priority requests are defined. These are requests that concern
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quality layers with a higher bit-rate than a peer can afford to upload. They will only be
satisfied if the peer that receives one is not fully utilising its capacity and they will not
be added to the current debt or credit.
It is intuitive to prove that it is not convenient for a peer to ask for all the chunks
as low priority requests. For instance, no chunks belonging to the base layer can ever
be requested under these circumstances. This would imply that the peer that sends the
request does not meet the minimum requirements to be allowed inside the P2P network.
Moreover, as far as enhancement layers are concerned, requests will only be satisfied
if there is enough spare capacity in the system. In this case, a peer that can afford
to upload a certain layer which asks for chunks belonging to the same layer with low
priority only lowers the chance of having this request accepted and therefore has no
interest from unilaterally changing its strategy.
5.4.3 Resource Optimisation
This algorithm aims to achieve real-time streaming through accurate resource allocation.
In applications such as live streaming, it is fundamental to keep the upload channels of
all the peers constantly busy. It has already been proven [105] that in order for the peers
to be fully served, for a non-scalable video the following condition needs to be satisfied:∑
i | Pi∈N
ci ≥ (|N | − 1)× s, (5.17)
where N is the set of peers (including the source), ci is the upload capacity of a peer Pi,
|N | is the total number of peers and s is the video bit-rate. It is possible to extend the
condition stated in Eq. (5.17) to scalable video sequences.
Lemma 5.1. Assuming that a scalable video with bit-rates b1, . . . , bj, . . . , bmax is used,
and each peer Pi has a target bit-rate b
i
t, in order to achieve these received bit-rates the
following condition needs to hold:∑
i | Pi∈N
ci ≥
∑
i | Pi∈N\{S}
bit, (5.18)
where S is the source of the video.
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Proof. Considering the total flow of data entering and leaving each peer, the Lemma
follows.
We now assume that the number of peers in the network is high and the contribution
of the source is therefore negligible. Moreover, in order for a peer not to be marked as a
free-rider, following from the proof of Proposition 5.1 the outgoing flow of data on every
single channel should roughly correspond to the incoming one. In this specific case, the
former condition can be rewritten as follows:
ci ≥ bit, ∀i | Pi ∈ N\{S}. (5.19)
The two terms of the inequality shown in Eq. (5.19) can only be equal in case of optimal
resource allocation, for example the one that fully exploits the upload capacity of all the
peers. In some cases, however, this does not happen as some peers do not have any data
their neighbours are interested in.
This problem can be partially overcome by uploading more data to the most deprived
peers [106]. Considering the set of useful chunks a peer has (where useful could mean
those inside a sliding window), its most deprived neighbour is the one who does not own
the largest number of chunks in this set.
5.4.4 Optimal Policy for Resource Allocation and Free-riding
Detection
As far as our resource allocation algorithm is concerned, a peer Pk adopts the following
strategy when receiving a request ri from Pi: First of all, every time a request is received,
it is associated with a time-stamp and a time-to-live (TTL). Moreover, it is associated
with a score s(ri). This score is defined as follows:
• If χsk(i, t)−χrk(i, t) ≥ ∆max, s(ri) = −∞; this request will be immediately rejected,
as Pi might be a free-rider.
• If χsk(i, t) − χrk(i, t) < ∆max and the request has been sent with high priority, the
request will be inserted into a buffer and it will be associated with the following
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score:
s(ri) =
(
α · ϕidep + β · ϕicr
)
, (5.20)
where ϕidep is the deprivation factor and ϕ
i
cr is the credit factor of Pi, and α and
β are arbitrary constants which satisfy the condition α + β = 1. These quantities
will be explained in detail in the following paragraphs.
• If χsk(i, t) − χrk(i, t) < ∆max and the request has been sent with low priority, the
request will be inserted into the buffer with s(ri) = 0.
Every time a peer has finished sending a chunk, or if it is not sending any chunks, it
will select a piece to upload. Among all the requests in its buffer, it will accept the
one with the highest score, while the others will remain in the buffer until their TTL
expires. The TTL for each request is not fixed and it depends on the current arrival
rate of both high and low priority requests from its non-free-riding neighbours. If two
or more requests have the highest score, the peer will forward the chunk that has been
forwarded the least amount of times. An important remark is that low priority requests
will be only accepted if there is enough spare capacity in the system.
As far as the quantities in Eq. (5.20) are concerned, the deprivation factor is calcu-
lated as follows. Considering all the non-free-riding neighbours N∗k of Pk, for every peer
Pj in this set the number of chunks Pk could contribute to them are counted. This value
is also called the deprivation of peer Pj, or δ(Pj). The deprivation factor ϕ
i
dep of a peer
is therefore computed as:
ϕidep =
δ(Pi)∑
j∈N∗k
δ(Pj)
. (5.21)
In other words, ϕidep is the ratio between the number of chunks Pi is missing and the
total number of chunks the non-free-riding neighbours of Pk are missing. It should be
pointed out that the denominator in Eq. (5.21) cannot be zero when there are requests
in the buffer. In fact, if δ(Pi) is zero, it means that there is no possible contribution
towards Pi and the request makes no sense. Therefore, the denominator can only be
null if there are no possible contributions towards any of the peers, which implies that
the peer will not receive any requests and this calculation would not make sense. On
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the other hand, the credit factor ϕicr indicates the contribution received from another
peer and can be expressed as:
ϕicr =
χsk(i, t)− χrk(i, t) + ∆max∑
j∈Nk
χsk(j, t)− χrk(j, t) + ∆max
. (5.22)
It should be pointed out that χsk(j, t) − χrk(j, t) + ∆max in Eq. (5.22) is zero only if a
peers has run out of credit, in which case it does not make sense to compute this factor,
as the request will be rejected in any case. Therefore, the denominator in Eq. (5.22)
cannot be zero either. The deprivation factor helps achieve nearly optimal performance,
while the credit factor is used to encourage resource reciprocation.
These quantities are also explained in Figure 5.6 and 5.7. In Figure 5.6, showing
the credit factor, a peer gets a request rejected because it has already received too
many chunks. For all the other cases, the peers are assigned a score that depends both
on the contribution they gave and received. Similarly, in Figure 5.7 the sender peer
computes the deprivation factors using the information from its own chunk buffer and
its neighbours’.
5.4.5 Distribution of the First Copy
One of the critical aspects in P2P file sharing is the distribution of the first copy. Given
a certain upload capacity of the source, the aim of the proposed algorithm is to maximise
the data each peer has to share, increasing therefore the usage of their upload channels.
In our approach, peers cannot request any data from the source, which only pushes
data to selected peers in the swarm. First of all, the source identifies the most deprived
non-free-riding peer in the swarm. This can be achieved using a G2G-like [9] algorithm.
That is, peers will report to the source whenever they receive a chunk, specifying the
user they received it from. Depending on this information, the source will first estimate
if users have forwarded a number of chunks corresponding at least to the base layer
of the sequence and depending on this they will classify users either as cooperative or
deceptive. During the second phase, the source identifies the chunks this peer is missing.
Among them, the seeder will then forward the one that has been forwarded the least
amount of times.
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Figure 5.6: Example showing the credit factors of a peer’s neighbours.
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5.5 Implementation
For our experimental evaluation, we used a modified version of the ns-2 [111] network
simulator. It is a “discrete event simulator targeted at networking research”. It supports
simulation of TCP. Moreover, each Node in the network can be associated with an Agent
which generates packets and an Application, which performs several tasks (e.g. behave
according to a certain protocol).
The starting point was the BitTorrent simulation in ns-2 described in [112]. Both
packet-level and flow-level simulations are supported, however for our testing environ-
ment we only considered packet-level. A few modules have been added to provide an
interface between the P2P network and WSVC sequences and implement the reputation
mechanism described in the previous section. A new Application was created, which is
based on BitTorrentApp, proposed in [112]. Implementation of the proposed techniques
and integration with the rest of the simulator required over 2500 lines of code written
in C++ [113] and additional 150 lines written in tcl [114] were needed to set all the
simulation parameters, generate the nodes, the links and the routing table.
5.6 Results
For the purpose of simulation, City sequence – already used in previous evaluations – is
repeated 15 times (for a total of 150 seconds) and encoded in WSVC format. The spatial
resolution is 352×288 (CIF) and the frame rate is 30 fps. The video sequence is divided
into chunks of 4 kB. In addition, there are 7 quality layers, with bit-rate rb ranging from
256 kbps to 768 kbps. Information about WSVC GOPs and quality layers is stored in
a metadata file, which we assume to be available to all peers. We decided to use only
one sequence as WSVC allows to specify bit-rates manually and the differences between
layer sizes are very small (no more than 30 bytes in most cases, much smaller than the
defined BitTorrent chunk size). Table 5.3 shows a comparison among the cumulative
number of chunks that are necessary to decode a quality layer for City, InToTree and
Soccer when their extraction points are the same. As these values are the same and
the actual content of these chunks does not have an impact on the performance of the
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rb
Video
City InToTree Soccer
256 kbps 17 17 17
320 kbps 21 21 21
384 kbps 26 26 26
480 kbps 32 32 32
576 kbps 38 38 38
672 kbps 44 44 44
768 kbps 51 51 51
Table 5.3: Cumulative number of chunks forming a quality layer for City, InToTree and Soccer
sequences.
simulated system, we consider our results obtained with City to be also valid for slow
(InToTree) and fast-moving sequences (Soccer).
In our experiments, only one source has the full sequence at the beginning. Peers
are divided into two categories: regular users and free-riders. Regular users accept or
reject requests according to the proposed algorithm, while free-riders reject any request
they receive. We assume all the peers to join the system within a one-second interval,
in order to keep their playback positions synchronised. After a pre-buffering phase, the
playback starts.
In our tests, the network consists of 11, 31, 51 or 101 peers. This includes a video
source, which has the same bandwidth as the other users. We consider scenarios with
different upload capacities (50, 75 and 100 kB/s), fractions of free-riders (0%, 33%, 50%
and 66%) and values of the credit line. Moreover, α and β range between 0 and 1, with
β = 1 − α. A comparison with an existing technique [85] is also shown. In the next
paragraphs, the outcome of our experimental evaluation will be illustrated.
Figure 5.8 shows the impact of different credit lines on the behaviour of the system
when there are 11 peers with no free-riders in the network and (α, β) is set to (0.5, 0.5).
The credit line ∆max grows exponentially with a power of 2 and it ranges between 1
and an infinite number of chunks. The average received video bit-rate grows as ∆max
grows up to a certain threshold, which in this case is 8 chunks. For values below the
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Figure 5.8: Average received video bit-rate with 11 peers, ci = 75kB/s and 0% FRs.
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(a) Cooperative users.
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Figure 5.9: Average received video bit-rate by (a) Cooperative users and (b) Free-riders with
31 peers, ci = 75kB/s and 66% FRs.
threshold, cooperative peers are incorrectly detected as free-riders, which causes poor
system performance. For ∆max = 1, the average received video bit-rate (about 50 kbps)
is lower than the bit-rate of the base layer (256 kbps), therefore real-time streaming is
not achieved in this case. However, with ∆max set to 4 chunks, the performance of the
system is nearly optimal. Finally for values of ∆max above the threshold, the system is
fully utilising its resources and the received video bit-rate remains the same even with
a maximum debit or credit set to infinite.
On the other hand, when 66% of the peers are free-riders as shown in Figure 5.9(a)
and 5.9(b), using a ∆max above 4 chunks causes a degradation in the received video
bit-rate of cooperative users, while free-riders gain a benefit as the credit line grows.
However, due to the G2G-like free-riding detection mechanism used by the source, the
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Figure 5.10: Average received video bit-rate by cooperative peers and FRs as a function of
α and β varying the number of peers in the network, their capacity ci, and the
percentage of misbehaving users.
free-riders’ credit factor being very low and the large amount of misbehaving peers in
the network, their average received video bit-rate remains very low. Specifically, in this
case they only manage to decode a very limited number of GOPs.
We are also considering the impact of parameters α and β on the behaviour of the
system. The credit line is set to 4 chunks, as in most of the cases this value allows
cooperative users to achieve the best performance, and there are 33% or 50% of free-
riders in the network.
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Before proceeding to the analysis of the results, let us now consider what would
happen if a peer Pi changed the weights assigned to credit and deprivation factor unilat-
erally. First of all, by increasing α and uploading more data to deprived peers, Pi would
not repay its debts towards another peer Pj as quickly as Pj’s neighbours, increasing Pi’s
chance of being marked as a free-rider. On the other hand, by unilaterally increasing
β, Pi would reciprocate resources more quickly, but not as quickly as Pi’s neighbours
would reciprocate theirs. Moreover, this would necessarily result in decreasing α. It
is worth noticing that giving more importance to the deprivation factor presents a few
similarities with optimistic unchoking in BitTorrent. This implies that by reducing α,
Pi would decrease its chances of discovering good peers in the network, increasing the
other peers’ instead.
Figure 5.10 shows the results for (α, β) ranging from (0, 1) to (1, 0) for different num-
bers of peers. An important remark is that for (α, β) = (0, 1) the system is very similar
to the one presented in [85]. These graphs indicate that when free-riders are in the
swarm, considering both the credit and the deprivation factor gives better results than
trying to solve the problem of resource reciprocation and delay minimisation alone. The
graph in Figure 5.10(d), obtained with 101 peers, shows a very similar behaviour of the
system with (α, β) = (0.5, 0.5) and (0.75, 0.25). Despite the first set of values being the
best, this result suggests that for bigger networks different values of (α, β) might lead
to a better performance since, as the number of users increases so does deprivation, all
the other parameters being equal. However, all graphs from Figure 5.10(a) to 5.10(d)
indicate that (α, β) = (0.5, 0.5) gives the best performance. Therefore, our experimental
evaluation verified that both factors are important, and more specifically equally im-
portant. That is, setting α = β results in a balance between accepting to forward data
to the peer that has less to share – to increase the overall performance of the system,
but also to potentially discover discover a good neighbour – and promptly repaying a
peer’s current debt, to avoid being marked as a free-rider. In fact, when increasing α
over β (as a global parameter), the system is more vulnerable to free-riding, whereas in
the opposite case, it is more vulnerable to starvation.
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5.7 Conclusion
We described a framework for P2P scalable video transmission that exploits elements
of credit-based systems and delay minimisation algorithms. We also defined credit and
deprivation factors and analysed how giving them different weights had an impact on
the performance of the system. The strongest aspect of our approach is that free-riders
are cut out of the system, while cooperative users can achieve real time streaming.
Moreover, using scalable video we also promoted fairness among users with different
upload capacities. On the other hand, this system might be vulnerable to sudden changes
in the network (churn) and handwash attacks, where free-riders leave the network and
re-join it with a different identity. Finally, the free-riding detection mechanism described
here only depends on the information collected by one peer. The effectiveness of this
approach could be improved if the peers in the network could share information about
the users they have dealt with. Therefore, in the next chapter, we will extend the work
described here by adding social features to the system.
Chapter 6
Social-based Free-riding Detection
This chapter describes a social-based framework for P2P transmission. It is an extension
of our research work presented in Chapter 5, which means the objective is again to
identify free-riders and optimise resource utilisation, however this is now also achieved
through exploitation of social relationships. In fact, peers that choose to become part of
the social network are not anonymous entities anymore – as their identity can be verified
– and interact either with other “social” users or regular peers. In our system, peers
that have an identity and have established friendship relationships with other users
can cooperate and share information about the rest of the network. The rest of the
chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.1 describes the problem in detail; Section 6.2
presents the relevant background; Section 6.3 explains our proposed approach and how
the social reputation of a peer can be calculated; Section 6.4 presents the results of our
experimental evaluation; finally Section 6.5 concludes the chapter.
6.1 Problem Description
In our previous approach, each peer was trying to estimate what type of peer it was
interacting with by analysing the neighbour’s behaviour towards itself. However, the
peer had no knowledge of other users’ interactions with this peer. Supposing that this
were common knowledge this could, in principle, help draw a more accurate picture of
what type of users are in the network and clearly identify who the free-riders are. A
reasonable approach would seem to gather all this information from all peers in the net-
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work and build a centralised database where the past behaviour of each user is stored.
This, however, presents two main challenges: first, handling all this information would
incur in additional costs; and second – and more importantly – peers could lie and this
information could not be considered fully reliable. It is however possible to build trust in
P2P networks, and our solution for achieving this is to rely on social relationships, such
as friendship. Therefore, the problem becomes understanding how to exploit these rela-
tionships for more accurate free-riders identification and punishment. More specifically,
this task can be divided into:
• Identifying what type of information peers can share with other trusted users.
• Formulating an algorithm that uses this information to understand if another peer
is a free-rider, building de facto a social reputation for that peer.
• Proposing a new tracker policy for building of the overlay network that allows users
that trust each other to interact with the same unknown users.
6.2 Related Work
In this section we describe a few social-based P2P systems. Some of them introduce
the concept of friendship among users, while others consider social features in terms of
expected behaviour given the characteristic of a certain peer. All these systems have
a common denominator: in contrast with early P2P systems, users are not anonymous
entities that interact with other unknown peers; in fact, each of them is associated to
an identity and its behaviour can in principle be traced. Other existing systems, not
described here, propose a social network for data sharing based on P2P [115] or try to
analyse trust and reputation systems in P2P [116].
6.2.1 Tribler BitTorrent Client: Social-based Features
BitTorrent client Tribler [68], already introduced in Section 4.3.3, can be considered an
example of social P2P. In this system, social features have been introduced to tackle the
following problems:
Social-based Free-riding Detection 131
• Decentralisation: some P2P systems are not fully decentralised, for example they
can have a single point of failure. Exploiting these features might help to achieve
this goal efficiently, since most of the information could be shared only among
people that belong to the same social group.
• Availability: adding social-based features to the system can incentivise peers to
behave in a more altruistic way, for example they might share content for a longer
period of time and consequently increase availability.
• Integrity. To reduce pollution in P2P systems, users can contact “trusted” peers,
whose best interest is to actively participate in this process. These peers should
avoid sharing corrupt or fake content, if they do not want their reputation to be
ruined.
• Incentives Provision: social incentives can help reducing the problem of free-
riding. In fact, users will tend not to “steal” resources from members of their own
community and therefore they will be less likely to download from them without
giving anything in exchange.
• Network Transparency: since the introduction of dynamic IP addresses, NAT
boxes and firewalls, peers cannot send any content anywhere without the need of
a trusted mediator, and again “trust” can be achieved using social-based features.
In Tribler, peers are de-anonymised and a log of all their previous activity is kept. This
information is used to build a reputation of the peers, as well as a profile of a user’s
favourite content. Moreover, groups can be created and peers can get recommendations
about a certain content (and download the corresponding torrent file) from users with
similar preferences. Peers can also discover other users and files using epidemic proto-
cols [68]. In addition to this, friendship is defined. If a peer is a friend of another peer, it
can help it with the download of a file. The two peers will download two different sets of
chunks and the “helper” will upload the data it received to its friend, without expecting
anything in exchange. In the context of scalable video transmission, this approach can
in principle help receive a better video quality, however, it requires that part of the
upload bandwidth of the helper is dedicated to uploading data to its friend, and not to
reciprocating resources of the peers it is downloading from. In P2P systems that use
free-riding detection mechanisms, this may cause this peer to be marked as malicious.
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6.2.2 P2P Protocols Based on Social Norms
This approach [117] is based on the concept that each peer in the network has a global
reputation, which determines its strategy. A social norm is in fact made of two elements:
first a social strategy, which “represents the rule prescribing to the peers when they
should or should not provide contents to other peers based on their own reputation as
well as the reputation of the requesting peers” and second a reputation scheme, which
“rewards or punishes peers depending on whether they comply or not with the social
strategy”.
For each peer, a set of allowed actions A = {S,NS} is defined, where S corresponds
to “Request Served” and NS to “Request Not Served”. Moreover, peers also have a
tag θ representing their global reputation or social status. θ is assumed to be a natural
number belonging to Θ = {0, 1, · · · , L}; L is is the maximum reputation and it is a
parameter of the system, while higher θ corresponds to higher reputation and reflects a
cooperative behaviour in the past.
In this framework, peers will behave according to the following strategy σ:
σ(θ, θ˜) =
S if θ ≥ h(σ) and θ˜ ≥ h(σ)NS otherwise . (6.1)
Eq. (6.1) shows that there is a reputation threshold h(σ) under which a θ-peer will not
cooperate with a θ˜-peer and will not receive a contribution, as this is what is requested
by the social norm. Similarly, two peers with good reputation (above the threshold) are
required to cooperate. If the peers follow what is prescribed by the social norm, their
social reputation will increase, otherwise they will receive a punishment. The paper
continues analysing different punishment schemes. For example, the reputation of a
peer can be reset to 0 if it refuses to cooperate, or it can just be lowered. Punishments
normally result in peers being excluded from chunk exchanges for a certain number of
turns (until their reputation becomes high enough again). Effects of free-riders, peers
that are always altruistic and transmission errors are also taken into account.
This paper [117] is important for two reasons: first, the attitude of a peer towards
another user does not depend on its previous interactions with it, on the contrary it
relies on its global social reputation. This implies that resource reciprocation is not
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List of Symbols
Pi Peer i
Risoc(Pj) Social reputation of Pj according to Pi
F ij Set of friends of Pi that have interacted with Pj
|F ij | Number of friends of Pi that have interacted with Pj
∆max Maximum acceptable credit or debit a peer can have towards
another peer
∆soc Social reputation threshold; can also be seen as “social credit”
χsk(i, t) Number of chunks Pk has sent to Pi at time t
χrk(i, t) Number of complete and unpolluted chunks Pk has received
from Pi at time t
ϕidep Deprivation factor of Pi, as computed by another peer
ϕicr Credit factor of Pi, as computed by another peer
α, β Weighting factors for ϕidep and ϕ
i
cr respectively
ri Chunk request, sent from Pi
s(ri) Score assigned to ri
Table 6.1: List of symbols in use for the proposed approach.
necessarily direct anymore. Second, peers have different strategies and are expected to
maintain a different behaviour according to their type. It is worth mentioning that the
research work in [117] does not consider scalable video. Some ideas on how to exploit
scalability in a similar scenario will be discussed in Section 7.2 as a starting point for
future work. A critical aspect of this approach, however, is that it is based on a global
reputation, which may be difficult to manage if the size of the network grows, and it
might be vulnerable to collusion attacks, where malicious peers report wrong information
to the reputation manager.
6.3 Proposed Approach
This proposed approach has been published in [17]. Its block diagram is shown in
Figure 6.1. The chunk selection algorithm is the same as the one used in Chapter 5 and
the main difference with the diagram in Figure 5.4 is the presence of a “Social Network”
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Figure 6.1: Block diagram for the proposed approach.
block, which elaborates the information received from friend peers and builds a social
reputation for those peers which friends have interacted with. A list of symbols used in
the description of this approach can be found in Table 6.1.
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6.3.1 Credit-Based Framework
Due to completeness, we briefly describe here the main characteristics of our credit-
based framework. More details can be found in Section 5.4. A credit line mechanism is
used and there is a maximum number of chunks a peer can download from another user
without giving anything in exchange. If a peer requests more, it will be marked as mali-
cious. However, as the experimental evaluation will show in Section 6.4, in the proposed
framework we are relaxing the constraints on the maximum debit, giving less import-
ance to direct reciprocation, as in practice we also want to consider indirect cooperation.
Moreover, similarly to our previous approach, two different types of requests are defined:
regular and low priority. This is necessary, as we proved with Proposition 5.1 in Sec-
tion 5.4.2 that peers should not request more data than they can afford to upload, but
we would also like to exploit the spare resources in the system. Low-priority requests
will only be accepted if the peer that receives one is not fully utilising its capacity and
they will not be considered for the credit or debit computation.
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6.3.2 Social Networking Extension
The aim of this algorithm is to exploit information from trusted peers in the network
(friends) in order to better identify malicious users. We start by defining three types of
peers:
1. Peers inside the social network: We assume that they are always cooperative.
In fact, not being anonymous, their behaviour can be easily tracked [9]. When
choosing which peers to upload chunks to, they follow the strategy described in
this chapter.
2. Cooperative users outside the social network: These users follow the strategy
described in Chapter 5.
3. Free riders.
As far as our assumption regarding peers inside the social network is concerned, it
is necessary to illustrate further considerations regarding potential social attacks. In
Section 1.1 we already introduced Sybil attacks [10], where an entity presents itself to
other entities in the system using multiple identities. In our system, a malicious user
could potentially pretend to be several peers at the same time, requesting to establish
friendship connections with users it does not actually know. In a recent study by Manago
et al. [118] considering Facebook friendships established by a few students in an American
University, 90% of the connections were with close friends, activity partners, previous
connections or acquaintances, whereas 4% had been established with complete strangers.
We believe that this scenario might be realistic also for P2P systems, or in a practical
implementation of this architecture P2P users could be linked to existing social network
profiles, and therefore the impact of Sybil users may be limited. However, even supposing
that the percentage of friendship connections with unknown peers is higher than the one
found in the study, and that a significant share of these are malicious or Sybil users,
there are additional ways to tackle this problem:
i. as we already stated, since peers are not anonymous, their misbehaviour is easy to
manually detect by cooperative users, which can remove the link;
ii. there exists an automatic mechanism that can detect Sybil nodes with a high in-
terval of confidence, called SybilGuard [119].
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SybilGuard considers a social network where regular (honest) and Sybil nodes are both
present. When two nodes are connected by an edge, they are friends and if the edge is
between an honest and a Sybil user, it is called an attack edge. The number of attack
edges is limited by the number of connections the identities of a malicious entity can
establish with the rest of the network. The protocol then considers random walks,
which are defined in such a way that they verify a few properties when choosing an
honest node as starting point and are not likely to when starting from a Sybil node, due
to the limited number of attack nodes cooperative users can establish with the rest of
the network as compared to honest users. More specifically, this algorithm is able to
identify that several converging random walks start from Sybil nodes.
Regarding our approach, the credit line mechanism in Chapter 5 was introduced to
add some tolerance when a peer could not reciprocate resources immediately. However,
this mechanism only considered the information a single peer had about the rest of the
network. In this context, on the other hand, when a peer needs to mark a user which
is not a friend as cooperative or free-rider, it can ask its friends – which have interacted
with this user – for the number of chunks they have exchanged and classify the peer
according to this information. In a practical implementation, this information exchange
could either be direct, or handled by the tracker. An illustration of the concept of social
reputation is given in Figure 6.2. More specifically, the social reputation of peer Pj,
according to Pi is defined as:
Risoc(Pj)=ˆ
∑
k|Pk∈F ij
χsk(j, t)− χrk(j, t), (6.2)
where again χrk(i, t) is the number of complete and unpolluted chunks Pk received from
Pi at time t, χ
s
k(i, t) is the number of chunks Pk sent to Pi at time t and F
i
j are those
friends of Pi which interacted with Pj. It is calculated as the overall credit or debt
towards a peer’s set of friends. This quantity needs to be compared to a threshold which
is based on the number of friends an unknown peer has interacted with. Its definition
is based on the idea that the larger the number of interactions is, the bigger the overall
contribution to these peers should be. Therefore, the incremental allowance (in chunks)
given by the presence of one more peer in F ij should decrease as a function of its size.
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More formally, the social reputation threshold is defined as:
∆soc=ˆ
∆max |F ij |∑
n=1
1
n
 , (6.3)
where |F ij | is the number of friends of Pi which have interacted with Pj. Therefore,
if Risoc(Pj) < ∆soc, Pj is marked as cooperative, otherwise it will have a bad social
reputation and Pi will refuse to cooperate with it.
We remind that that the optimal value for ∆max in the non-social case, found in the
experimental evaluation in Section 5.6 was a trade-off between minimising the number
of cooperative users erroneously detected as misbehaving and minimising the amount
of data uploaded to free-riders. By exploiting social features, it is possible to increase
the value of ∆max, as it will be shown in Section 6.4. This happens as free-riders will
have a low social reputation, while cooperative users will have the chance to reciprocate
resources to other peers.
6.3.3 Optimal Policy for Resource Allocation and Social
Free-riding Detection
As far as our social-based resource allocation algorithm is concerned, a peer Pk adopts
the following strategy when receiving a request ri from a peer Pi: every time a request is
received, it is again associated with a time-stamp and a TTL. Moreover, it is associated
with a score s(ri), defined as follows:
• If χsk(i, t) − χrk(i, t) ≥ ∆max, or the peer has a bad social reputation, s(ri) = −∞;
this request will be immediately rejected, as Pi might be a free-rider.
• If χsk(i, t) − χrk(i, t) < ∆max and the request has been sent with high priority,
the request will be inserted into a buffer and associated with a score s(ri) =(
α · ϕidep + β · ϕicr
)
, where again ϕidep and ϕ
i
cr are the the deprivation and credit
factors of Pi – defined in Section 5.4.4 – as computed by Pk and α and β are
arbitrary constants that satisfy α + β = 1.
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• If χsk(i, t) − χrk(i, t) < ∆max and the request has been sent with low priority, the
request will be inserted into the buffer with s(ri) = 0.
It is important to notice that the main difference with respect to the system in Chapter 5
is represented by adding social reputation to the first condition. Similarly to our previous
approach, every time a peer sends a chunk, it will accept the request in the buffer with
the highest score, while the others will remain in the buffer until their TTL expires. The
TTL for each request depends on the current arrival rate of both high and low priority
requests from its non-free-riding neighbours. If two or more requests have the highest
score, the peer will forward the least forwarded chunk.
A short proof of concept in favour of our social-based approach is presented in Lemma
6.1.
Lemma 6.1. Let us suppose that a free-rider PFR is interacting with N peers. Assuming
that none of these are friends, the free-rider can download (N∆max) chunks before being
marked as a free-rider by all of them. If all N peers are friends, the maximum number
of downloaded chunks is ∆max + b∆max
∑N−1
n=1
1
n
c − 1 ≤ (N∆max) for N ≥ 2.
Proof. When no social relations are considered, the total threshold (N∆max) is just the
sum of all the credit granted by all the peers. On the other hand, considering a peer
Pi and its friends, the free-rider has a maximum allowance ∆max granted by Pi and a
“social” allowance or credit b∆max
∑N−1
n=1
1
n
c, according to Section 5.4.4 and Eq. (6.3).
As we already stated, a free-rider will be identified by Pi if it either runs out of its non-
social or social credit. Therefore, if it downloads ∆max − 1 chunks from Pi and ∆soc − 1
from Pi’s neighbours (the latter corresponds to the social reputation R
i
soc(PFR)), the
free-rider cannot have been identified yet at least by Pi. It is important to note that
since the free-rider is interacting with all the peers in this set, ∆soc is the same for all
these users.
As soon as the free-rider downloads a chunk from any peer in the set, it is marked as
a free-rider by Pi, but nothing can be said yet about any of the other peers Pk. If the
free-rider has downloaded ∆max−1 chunks from a user P ′k, the same argument holds for
this peer. On the other hand, if the free-rider has downloaded less than this value from
any other P ′′k , it must have downloaded more chunks from the neighbours of P
′′
k (since
the total number of downloaded chunks stays the same) and Rk′′soc(PFR) > R
i
soc(PFR).
Therefore, since we assumed that Risoc(PFR) = ∆soc − 1, the free-rider must have a bad
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social reputation according to P ′′k . The maximum number of chunks the free-rider can
download is thus the one stated by the Lemma.
On the other hand, under the same circumstances cooperative users not in the social
network will have bigger chances to reciprocate their resources to any of these peers and
will therefore not be affected by this detection mechanism.
6.3.4 Tracker
P2P networks can in principle consist of several hundreds of users. If peers are connected
to random users, the chance that a friend is connected to the same peer is very low.
Therefore, if friend peers are connected to different users it is impossible to build a social
reputation. This problem can be overcome while building the overlay network.
The behaviour of the tracker is the following:
• If a peer inside the social network connects to the network, requesting a list of
users, the tracker returns a list of its friends currently connected to the network.
• If a peer outside the social network (cooperative or free-rider) connects to the
network, the tracker returns a list of peers in the social network and their friends.
By doing so, we make sure that peers outside the social network are always connected
to users that can exchange information about them.
6.4 Results
This technique, similarly to our previous approach, has been implemented using ns-
2 [111] simulator. It required an additional 500 lines of code with respect to the system
described in Chapter 5 to manage the social network and the social reputation. In
addition, we generated a graph which satisfied the Watts-Strogatz small world topology
requirement [42] using the graph generator of Pajek [45]. As far as the parameters
mentioned in Section 2.4 are concerned, the number of users N was 50, K = 4 and p =
0.55. They satisfy the requirements of Eq. (2.1) withK > ln(50) = 3.91 and the resulting
graph satisfied the property of connection. Therefore, it became the social network used
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Figure 6.3: Social Network used in our experimental evaluation.
for our experiments, which is also shown in Figure 6.31. In Section 2.4 we already stated
the limitations of this model, however, our experiments are performed on a relatively
small network, and we are interested in analysing the impact of information coming from
trusted peers without considering “friends of friends” relationships, therefore we used
this simple algorithm. When performing experiments on a larger scale, other models
like the “forest fire” [47], also explained in Section 2.4, should be used.
As far as the test sequence is concerned, City was repeated 15 times (for a total of
150 seconds) and encoded in WSVC format. The spatial resolution was 352×288 (CIF)
and the frame rate 30 fps. The video sequence was split into chunks of 4 kB. In addition,
there were 7 quality layers, ranging from 256 kbps to 768 kbps. In our tests only one
source had the sequence and peers were divided into the three specified categories. We
always had 50 peers in the social network, a variable percentage of free-riders and the
1This figure has been generated with Pajek [45].
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remaining peers were cooperative users outside the social network. The peers joined
the system within a one-second interval. After the pre-buffering, the playback started.
Cooperative users had an upload bandwidth ci = 75 or 100 kB/s. The size of the
network in our sets of experiments was 81 or 121 peers. This included a video source,
which distributed the first copy.
Figure 6.4 shows the behaviour of the free-riding detection mechanism as ∆max is
changing. There are 81 peers in the network, of which 20% free-riders. The upload
bandwidth of the regular peers is 75 kB/s and the source’s capacity is 150 kB/s. The
graph shows that, similarly to our previous results in Section 5.6, the average received
video bit-rate is low for very small values of the maximum credit due to false positives,
as well as for a very large ∆max, where on the other hand free-riders have more freedom
of action. The average received video bit-rate presents a maximum for ∆max = 16.
This value is bigger than the one found in our previous results. Our finding is that, as
free-riders are also detected by analysing their social reputation, more tolerance can be
added with respect to the reciprocation towards a single user, for which we also have
already provided a short proof of concept in Lemma 6.1. An important remark is that
users in the social network perform better than the others, as due to the social-based
mechanism they upload less data to free-riders and more to users which reciprocate.
Figure 6.5 and 6.6 show the impact of the weights assigned to the credit and depriva-
tion factor α and β on the behaviour of the system. ∆max is set to 16 chunks and there
are 81 and 121 peers. Free-riders are 20% and 33% of the total users and the upload
bandwidth is 100 kB/s and 75 kB/s respectively. The source has now an upload capacity
which is 150% of the cooperative peers’. The graphs show the average received video
bit-rate for cooperative peers when (α, β) varies between (0.25, 0.75) and (0.75, 0.25).
These graphs indicate that peers in the social network benefit from a higher received
video bit-rate, and statistical analysis indicates that this difference is significant, as the
t-test for (α, β) = (0.5, 0.5) gives t > 10 with p < 2 · 10−15 in both cases. Moreover, as
far as the peers in the social network are concerned, the best weights for the deprivation
and credit factor are (α, β) = (0.5, 0.5), which once again represent the best trade-off
between trying to repay a peer’s debt promptly and trying to provide peers with data
which they can share. This result is also confirmed by the statistical analysis of variance
(ANOVA), as F > 7 and p < 0.05 for both sets of experiments.
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An important remark is that Figure 6.6 indicates that (α, β) = (0.5, 0.5) is not the
best value for the peers outside the social network. On the contrary, the graph suggests
that the average received bit-rate increases as the deprivation factor increases. The
differences with the other sets of experiments are: a higher number of peers, a lower
bandwidth and a higher percentage of free-riders and the graph suggests that peers
outside the social network are more vulnerable to these factors, which determines a
worse performance. Our interpretation to the different impact of α and β is that these
peers’ worse performance implies that they have less chunks to share with the rest of
the network. This results in a contribution to the other peers that is not enough to
have a good credit factor. Therefore, giving more weight to the deprivation factor could
improve their overall performance.
6.5 Conclusion
We proposed a framework for P2P scalable video transmission that exploited elements
from social networking, credit-based systems and optimal network resource allocation
algorithms. Peers that established social relationships with their neighbours could share
information about the rest of the network and better identify free-riders. Experimental
evaluation showed that, with respect to the approach described in Chapter 5, it was
possible to increase the value of the maximum allowed credit and still be able to identify
free-riders, thanks to our social-based detection algorithm. The results also confirmed
that giving equal weight to the credit and deprivation factor still represented the best
trade-off and allowed to maximise the received bit-rate. Finally, peers in the social
network were rewarded by a better received video quality.
As far as the potential critical aspects of this approach are concerned, we identified
the fact that peers always distinguish between free-riders and cooperative peers, not
keeping the heterogeneity of the network into account. This suggests some ideas for
future work, as peers for example could refuse to share their chunks belonging to upper
quality enhancement layers to peers which are not considered “good” enough.
In the next chapter, we will summarise all the achievements described in this thesis
and we will discuss how this work can be extended in the future.
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
This Chapter summarises the main contributions that can be found in this Ph.D. thesis
in the field of scalable video transmission over P2P, as well as providing directions for
future work.
7.1 Contributions
Our contributions described in this thesis can be summarised as:
• We performed a subjective video evaluation simulating different networking con-
ditions using two different scalable codecs: WSVC and H.264/SVC. We defined
realistic video transmission scenarios and asked test subjects to rank their visual
experience under these different circumstances. These results were compared with
an objective evaluation and the two codec themselves were compared both in terms
of objective and subjective performance. The conclusion of this study was taken
into account in the design of an actual P2P system.
• We designed a sliding window-based piece picking policy that requests the quality
layers of the original scalable video bit-stream in a hierarchical fashion, so that the
received video bit-rate can adapt to the current download bandwidth of a peer.
• We proposed a neighbour selection policy that only requests P2P chunks belonging
to the base layer to peers that have proven to be good enough. This policy ranks all
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the peers a user is currently downloading from according to their download speed
and subsequently selects the best users in the network.
• We built a credit-based framework for optimal resource allocation in P2P whose
joint aim is to cut free-riders out of the system. This technique uses a credit line
mechanism, which means that there is a maximum difference in the number of
video chunks two peers can exchange before the one which is in debt is marked
as a free-rider. We defined two types of requests: high and low priority. They
have a different impact on a user’s reputation to exploit any idle resources in the
network. For all the supposed non-free-riding peers, their requests are assigned a
score which depends on two factors: their past generosity towards the peer that
receives the request (credit factor) and the potential contribution they can receive
from it (deprivation factor). We also showed how giving different importance to
these two factors has an impact on the behaviour of the proposed system.
• We developed an algorithm that exploits the knowledge of a peer’s friends to com-
pute a third peer’s social reputation and uses it to determine if that peer is a
free-rider. It tries to estimate the behaviour of this unknown peer from the number
of friends it has interacted with and the number of video chunks that have been
exchanged with them. More specifically, this approach uses a credit line mechanism
applied to a larger set of peers. The maximum total difference allowed depends on
the size of this set, however, for each new interaction the additional granted credit
decreases.
• Finally, for the social-based approach, we designed a tracker protocol that generates
connections among users taking social relationships into account. Friend users are
connected among each other and peers outside the social network are linked to
groups of friend users. This way, free-riding peers can be detected by our social
based algorithm.
7.2 Future Work
The new High Efficiency Video Coding (HEVC) standard [120], also known as H.265 [121]
has been recently proposed. Its scalable extension is yet to be ratified, despite a few
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preliminary techniques having already been suggested [122, 123]. We believe that the
most sensible approach is first of all to research how our proposed algorithms can be
adapted to the new standard. Therefore, we are closely following all the updates related
to the development of this new codec. On the other hand, as far as the scalable codecs
currently available are concerned, we will perform tests on longer sequences, also con-
sidering the impact of playback pauses, and we will not only focus on subjective video
perception but also on QoE in terms of user engagement.
Moreover, possible directions regarding further development of our research work
include further exploitation of social-based features in P2P systems. Some ideas include:
• The overlay P2P network should only correspond to a social network. In this case,
peers are completely de-anonymised and it is very easy to detect free-riders and
malicious users in general. However, this approach requires a peer’s friends to be
interested in the same content. Intuitively, if there are not enough friends currently
in the swarm, the streaming might not be sustainable.
• Other techniques might not simply distinguish between friends and the rest of the
network, but consider the degree of separation. This approach might potentially
build a “chain of trust” that connects distant peers. Due to the small world topology
of social networks, information about users’ behaviour might travel fast through
the network. In our future research, we will either consider real social networks,
or generate graphs whose degree follows a power-law and that become more dense
over time, as suggested by the forest fire model [47].
• Friend peers that are interested in the same content might form coalitions to down-
load different sets of chunks, and dedicate part of their bandwidth for internal
exchange of what they have downloaded.
As far as our credit-based model is concerned, we will formulate it within a game
theoretic framework by considering the peer strategies and for example by proving that
the system is stable in terms of Nash Equilibrium. Furthermore, an idea to improve the
current state-of-the-art might come from Bayesian game theory [8]. In fact, each peer has
a maximum upload capacity it wants to share (zero for a free-rider), which determines
its maximum number of quality layers it can upload in real-time and therefore its type
θ. Each peer knows its own type – which we can also assume to be assigned by Nature
– and tries to estimate those of its neighbours from their actions. In order to achieve
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a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) at each time every player must follow a strategy
that maximises its expected pay-off given the expected strategies played by the other
users. These strategies depend on beliefs, based on a peer’s (incomplete) information set
(e.g. a list of previous interactions). That is, at each round of the game a peer can follow
a strategy that depends on the estimated type of its neighbour. Since we are dealing
with transmission of scalable video streams, a peer might for example refuse to share
enhancement layers of a sequence if it believes that its neighbour is not sharing enough
bandwidth. This approach still presents some open issues, such as how to efficiently
estimate a peer’s type and what the optimal resource allocation policy is if a peer
receives more requests than it can afford to accept.
Another open issue is the impact of sudden variations in the network (flash crowd,
churn, etc.). Auction-based mechanisms [124] or other models which see P2P network
as a market [125] could help solve this problem and this could become an interesting
area of research in the near future. Finally, another area of research could be network
coding [126,127] applied to P2P, which is an area we have already started exploring and
our contribution can be found in [18].
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